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1903 
THE MULTIPLE JUSTIFICATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING 
Nick Robinson 
Abstract: Nearly a quarter of all workers in the United States are currently in a job that 
requires an occupational license. As the prevalence of occupational licensing has grown, so 
have claims that its overuse is causing increased consumer costs and impairing labor mobility 
and economic freedom. To address these concerns, many policymakers and academics argue 
that licensing restrictions should be more closely tailored to the goal of protecting the public 
from harm and that, to guard against capture, practitioners should not regulate their own 
licensing. Federal courts, in turn, have drawn on this vision of the proper role of occupational 
licensing to significantly limit when and how licensing can be used through their interpretation 
of antitrust law and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 
This Article takes a step back to argue that these critiques of occupational licensing, and 
the federal jurisprudence based on them, embrace a narrow view of the role of licensing in the 
economy that is grounded in both an embrace of economic libertarianism and an antagonism 
towards professional self-regulation. While this view generally recognizes licensing as 
justified to protect the public from harm in limited situations, it disregards a range of other 
values that occupational licensing has historically been viewed to promote. This Article draws 
on social science literature to categorize these other justifications as (1) fostering communities 
of knowledge and competence; (2) developing relationships of trust; and (3) buffering 
producers from the market. 
The Article uses specific examples from the judiciary’s occupational licensing 
jurisprudence to show how acknowledging this broader set of justifications should constrain 
the courts from imposing a narrow view of licensing’s role in the economy. It ends by 
suggesting that if the federal government is to shape occupational licensing policy, Congress 
and the Executive are better placed than the judiciary to take the lead. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A wide range of occupations in the United States can require a license, 
including medical professionals, barbers, lawyers, and security guards.1 
Despite this variety, the central mechanism behind occupational licensing 
is relatively generalizable. The government mandates that only those who 
are licensed can perform designated occupational activities.2 To become 
licensed, one must meet prescribed entry requirements such as passing an 
exam or completing a training program.3 And a person may lose their 
license if they violate certain minimum occupational standards.4 
The use of this regulatory tool has become one of the defining features 
of the contemporary U.S. labor market. In the 1950s, only about 5% of 
the U.S. workforce was in a job that required an occupational license but, 
today, studies indicate that number has risen to between 20% and 29%.5 
                                                     
1. MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING 
COMPETITION? 4 (2006) (listing a number of occupations that can require a license). 
2. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 139 (1982) (similarly defining occupational 
licensing as a state-authorized monopoly on certain occupational activities).  
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational 
Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. & ECON. S173, S173–76 (2013). The authors found, based 
on a 2008 Westat survey, that 29% of the labor force were in jobs that required licenses and another 
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Notwithstanding its growing prevalence, policymakers and academics 
frequently treat occupational licensing like a regulatory relic—a holdover 
from the guilds of the Middle Ages.6 They claim occupational licensing 
requirements are overused causing increases in the cost of services,7 
limiting the employment opportunities for marginalized groups,8 and 
reducing economic freedom.9 In turn, they propose that occupational 
licensing restrictions should only be allowed when restrictions are closely 
tailored to the goal of protecting consumers or the public from harm.10 To 
guard against rent-seeking, or self-dealing behavior, policymakers argue 
that members of an occupation should not control their own regulation.11 
                                                     
6% were certified for their jobs. Id. at S176. The authors also noted that only 5% of the labor force 
were in a job that required a license in the 1950s. Id. at S175. The data from the 1950s includes only 
state licenses. This percentage would be higher if the survey had included jobs that required federal, 
city, or county licenses as the 2008 number does. Id. See also MAURY GITTLEMAN, MARK A. KLEE 
& MORRIS M. KLEINER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ANALYZING THE LABOR MARKET: 
OUTCOMES OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 504 (2014) (using 2008 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation data to find that approximately 20% of the labor force acquired licenses and another 8% 
were certified for their jobs). 
6. See Morris M. Kleiner, Our Guild-Ridden Labor Market, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO ONLINE F. 
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.cato.org/publications/cato-online-forum/our-guild-ridden-labor-market 
[https://perma.cc/L99F-NTDP]; Jon Sanders, Occupational Licensing: Guild by Association, JOHN 
LOCKE FOUND. (Oct. 11, 2012), https://www.johnlocke.org/update/occupational-licensing-guild-by-
association/ [https://perma.cc/A96J-DJAF]. 
7. KLEINER, supra note 1, at 9–10 (noting that “[t]he dominant view among economists is that 
occupational licensing restricts the supply of labor to the occupation and thereby drives up the price 
of labor and services rendered”).  
8. DEP’T OF TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS & DEP’T OF 
LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 35–39 (2015) [hereinafter 
WHITE HOUSE REPORT] (noting that licensing can limit the opportunities of those with a criminal 
record and immigrants in the labor market). 
9. Libertarians, in particular, lament licensing’s restrictive impact on economic freedom. The 
Institute for Justice is perhaps the leading libertarian organization that has led the fight against what 
they view as excessive occupational licensing requirements. See INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/2DNC-8MMB]. However, there are also other libertarian organizations that have 
advocated curtailing licensing. See, e.g., ADAM B. SUMMERS, REASON FOUND., OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING: RANKING THE STATES AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES (2007) (recommending curtailing 
licensing requirements on behalf of the Reason Foundation); About Reason Foundation, REASON 
FOUND., https://reason.org/about-reason-foundation/ [https://perma.cc/HY2A-EEWL] (promoting 
libertarian principles). 
10. MORRIS M. KLEINER, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICIES 17–18 (2015) 
[hereinafter KLEINER, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICIES], 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/reforming_occupational_licensing_morr
is_kleiner_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/48AM-Z2MF] (arguing that states should only adopt 
occupational licensing restrictions where there is a benefit of protecting consumers from harm and 
that benefit outweighs the costs); WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 43–45 (concluding that 
licensing restrictions should be closely targeted to protecting public health and safety).  
11. See, e.g., DICK CARPENTER ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY 
OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 25, 29–30 (2012), https://ij.org/wp-
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This critique of occupational licensing has also gained proponents in 
the federal courts. Although occupational licensing has traditionally been 
viewed as a state and local subject,12 over the past several decades, the 
federal courts have created de facto occupational licensing jurisprudence 
through interpretation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution as well as antitrust law. This federal jurisprudence 
significantly limits when and how occupational licensing restrictions may 
be used. For example, in a series of cases starting in the 1970s, the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down restrictions on advertisement and solicitation 
in the professions as violating a right to commercial speech under the First 
Amendment.13 Building on this jurisprudence, in 2014, a federal circuit 
court found an occupational licensing regime for local tour guides 
unconstitutional.14 Federal courts have also used the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down 
occupational licensing requirements for jobs like African hair braiders, 
casket sellers, and some pest control professionals.15 And in the 2015 
antitrust case North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,16 
the Court weighed in against the traditional self-regulation of many 
occupations. The Court found that if occupational licensing boards are 
“controlled” by practitioners (i.e., “market participants”) and not actively 
supervised by the state, the boards can face antitrust scrutiny.17 This 
decision led to a wave of antitrust challenges against licensing boards and 
caused many states to modify how they supervise these boards.18 
                                                     
content/uploads/2015/04/licensetowork1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6R7-VX4M] (arguing that licensing 
requirements are frequently created by practitioners to keep out competition); CAROLYN COX & 
SUSAN FOX, FTC, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION ix (1990) 
(recommending that “[i]f some form of regulation is necessary, then it may be better for consumers 
if an outside body, rather than the profession, is responsible for administering the regulations”).  
12. KLEINER, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing that Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), gave 
authority over occupational licensing to the states); WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 41–43, 
54–55 (noting that “licensing policy falls in the purview of individual States,” tailoring all of its 
recommendations to reform licensing at the states, and mentioning only relatively minor initiatives 
by the federal government already undertaken to improve licensing at the state level).  
13. For an overview of this free speech jurisprudence, see infra section II.B.  
14. In 2014, the D.C. Circuit struck down the licensing of tour guides as restricting free speech 
under the First Amendment. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014). For 
a fuller discussion of relevant First Amendment jurisprudence, see infra section II.B. 
15. For a discussion of these cases and other relevant Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, see 
infra section II.C. 
16. 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
17. Id. at 1115–16. For a fuller discussion of the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners 
decision, see infra section II.A.  
18. For a discussion of this litigation and new initiatives by states to supervise licensing boards in 
the wake of North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, see infra section II.A.  
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Some policymakers and academics have celebrated these rulings.19 Yet 
this federal jurisprudence risks the courts imposing, and frequently 
constitutionalizing, a narrow economic ideology grounded in free market 
libertarianism and antagonism towards professional self-regulation. 
Occupational licensing is generally recognized as justified to protect the 
public from harm, even by critics, at least in limited situations. However, 
other values that occupational licensing has historically been viewed to 
promote are frequently neglected or discounted.20 This Article takes a step 
back to draw on the social science literature to identify three other 
justifications of occupational licensing that it categorizes as: (1) fostering 
communities of knowledge and competence; (2) developing relationships 
of trust; and (3) buffering producers from the market.21 
Despite these other justifications often being overlooked, they each 
have roots in prominent intellectual traditions. For example, scholars like 
Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons celebrated the professions, and their 
ability to set enforceable standards, as critical to regulating the use of 
expertise in a modern society.22 These occupational communities help not 
just to protect consumers from harm, but also to foster the development 
of expert knowledge and craft in the first place and aid in the smooth 
functioning of the economy.23 
Meanwhile, Eliot Friedson and others have applauded occupational 
licensing for its ability to create stronger relationships of trust between 
practitioners and the public.24 In this view, licensing can support 
practitioners’ sense of trusteeship over their jobs, promoting occupational 
                                                     
19. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Smile! Alito Revisits 19th Century Law, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2015, 
8:41 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-02-27/smile-alito-revisits-19th-century-
law (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (applauding the majority’s opinion in North Carolina Board of Dental 
Examiners); DC Tours, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/case/dc-tours/ [https://perma.cc/K43U-P5XD] 
(celebrating the D.C. Circuit’s decision to strike down licensing requirements for tour guides under 
the First Amendment).  
20. See, e.g., Economic Liberty, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/economic-liberty 
[https://perma.cc/7QVG-F2EA] (noting that occupational licensing may be justified on grounds of 
public health and safety but listing no other justifications). 
21. For a detailed account of the justifications of occupational licensing, see infra Part III. 
22. EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIL MORALS 6–7 (1958) (suggesting that the 
professions develop and enforce professional rules for the benefit of society); TALCOTT PARSONS, 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (1954) (suggesting that professions were vital to the 
development of modern society).  
23. See infra section III.A.  
24. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM, THE THIRD LOGIC: ON THE PRACTICE OF KNOWLEDGE 1–
16 (2001) (concluding that, historically, professionalism was driven by expertise coupled with an 
internal code of ethics that oriented professionals differently towards their work). 
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duty, civic engagement, and alternative sources of authority that can help 
check both government and corporate power.25 
Finally, occupational licensing can be viewed as a protectionist force 
for producers. Thinkers like Karl Polyani have claimed that one of the 
primary goals of the state should be to protect workers from the 
dislocating forces of the market.26 Occupational licensing requirements 
can reduce turnover in the labor force, raise wages of practitioners, and, 
more generally, help protect the position of the professional middle 
class.27 Even if these benefits to practitioners with a license come with 
costs to consumers or other workers, they can help provide stable jobs for 
a substantial segment of the labor force that, in some situations, may bring 
a broader set of benefits to society.28 
To be clear, this Article does not argue that these justifications for 
occupational licensing are applicable in every context or that the overuse 
of occupational licensing does not (it certainly can).29 Rather, it claims 
that the choice of when and how to use licensing is a political decision 
that involves answering questions about what values the economy should 
prioritize and how it should function. For instance, is occupational 
knowledge and craft best generated and standardized through the market, 
professional communities, or other means?30 In a specific occupation, 
should the government promote labor market individualism or 
                                                     
25. For a discussion of how occupational licensing and self-regulation may promote this sense of 
social trusteeship, see infra section III.B. 
26. See generally KARL POLYANI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2001). As scholars like James Whitman and Michael Sandel have shown, 
U.S. law has not always equated public welfare so squarely with consumer welfare, but also 
emphasized protecting certain forms of production. See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus 
Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007) (explaining that, compared to 
law in the United States today, law in both the United States historically and contemporary Europe 
was more focused on producer interests); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: 
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 231–45 (1996) (noting that, as opposed to solely 
protecting consumer interests, antitrust law was originally envisioned, in part, as a tool to preserve 
the decentralized economy of small businesses and trades necessary for self-governance). 
27. GITTLEMAN, KLEE & KLEINER, supra note 5 (suggesting that those with a license earn higher pay, 
are more likely to be employed, and have a higher probability of retirement and pension plan offers). 
28. For a fuller discussion of this argument, see generally infra section III.C.  
29. There are real concerns about licensing that should be addressed. For example, much recent 
attention by reformers has emphasized seemingly absurd licensing requirements, such as for interior 
designers or florists, or the employment barriers licensing creates for immigrants or those with a 
criminal record. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 35–39. 
30. See section III.B.  
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professional trusteeship?31 Or how should the regulation of a sector of the 
economy balance the interests of consumers with those of producers?32 
Using specific examples from the First Amendment, Fourteenth 
Amendment, and antitrust contexts, this Article shows how 
acknowledging this broader set of potential justifications should caution 
the federal courts from imposing any particular economic vision of the 
role of occupational licensing.33 Instead, this Article suggests that 
Congress and the Executive should take the lead if the federal government 
is to be increasingly involved in occupational licensing. These branches 
of government have already become directly involved in setting 
occupational licensing standards in specific fields—such as transportation 
and finance—and have promoted a range of “best practices” for 
occupational licensing more generally.34 Compared to federal courts, 
Congress and the Executive have a greater range of interventions available 
to them, can more readily tailor these interventions to specific 
occupations, and, given their more direct political accountability, are 
better suited to weigh different visions of licensing in the economy.35 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I briefly examines the growth 
of occupational licensing in the United States, the primary policy 
criticisms of occupational licensing, and its traditional regulation by state 
and local governments. Part II describes the development of a federal 
occupational licensing jurisprudence that significantly limits when and 
how licensing requirements can be imposed. Part III lays out four 
justifications for occupational licensing. Part IV shows through specific 
examples why acknowledging this broader set of justifications should 
limit the federal courts’ interventions. Part V concludes that Congress and 
the Executive, not the courts, are better positioned within the federal 
government to take on a more proactive role in shaping the use of 
occupational licensing in the economy. 
I. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
A. Growth and Contemporary Reach 
Whether caste in India or the guild system in Europe, social and legal 
rules about who can perform certain occupational activities have long 
                                                     
31. See section III.C. 
32. See section III.D.  
33. See Part IV.  
34. For a fuller discussion of these federal interventions, see infra section II.B.  
35. Id. 
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existed.36 Restrictions have been based on family lineage, agreements 
with local rulers, gender, or other criteria.37 Over time, most of these forms 
of occupational regulation have decreased in prominence or been 
eliminated,38 just as many forms of worker self-organization have also 
waned. For example, union membership, which historically was often all 
but required to perform certain crafts,39 has declined from about 35% of 
the private sector workforce in the United States in the 1950s to 6.6% in 
2012.40 
Occupational licensing, on the other hand, has seen a steady increase 
in its role in organizing the labor force.41 At first, this expansion might 
seem counter-intuitive. After all, consumers are more educated than ever 
before, as are workers,42 arguably creating less of a chance of abuse of 
consumers and so less need for licensing. Demand for licensing has 
frequently come from professional associations and regulatory boards 
dominated by practitioners, leading some to claim this growth has been 
significantly driven by regulatory capture.43 Yet, the government and the 
                                                     
36. For more on the history of guilds in Europe and their power to monopolize certain crafts or 
trades, see S.R. Epstein, Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Pre-industrial 
Europe, in GUILDS, INNOVATION AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY, 1400–1800, 52–53 (S.R. Epstein & 
Maarten Prak eds., 2008). For a general description of the caste system in India, see MARC 
GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN INDIA 7–17 (1984). 
37. KLEINER, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
38. For example, Article 15 of the Constitution of India prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
caste or sex. BHĀRATĪYA SAṂVIDHĀNA [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 26, 1950, art. 15 (India). Guilds were 
abolished in much of Europe by the turn of the eighteenth century. See S. R. Epstein & Maarten Prak, 
Introduction: Guilds, Innovation, and the European Economy, 1400–1800, in GUILDS, INNOVATION 
AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY, 1400–1800, supra note 36, at 1. 
39. Craft unions have a long history not only in the United States, but in medieval Europe and in 
ancient Rome and Greece. See JOHN P. FREY, CRAFT UNIONS OF ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES 
(1945). Craft unions in mid-twentieth century United States dominated certain crafts, providing 
apprenticeship and other training to their members. Id. at 104–12. 
40. Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Workforce in a Union Falls to 97 Year Low, 11.3%, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/business/union-membership-drops-
despite-job-growth.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
41. See supra note 5. 
42. For example, in 1940 in the United States, approximately 38% of persons between the ages of 
twenty-five and twenty-nine had graduated high school. By 2013, this number had risen to about 90%. 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2016-006, DIGEST OF EDUCATION 
STATISTICS 38 tbl.104.20 (2014), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_104.20.asp 
[https://perma.cc/FUB8-HR3Q]. 
43. See, e.g., KLEINER, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that licensing requirements could be a form of rent 
capture by practitioners who are attempting to limit entry into the occupation or restrict information about 
pricing). For an early account of regulatory capture, see George J. Stigler, Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (arguing that certain groups “demand” regulation 
where it economically benefits them, thus influencing the “supply” of regulation). 
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public have also been substantial drivers of more licensing.44 This trend 
may be a result of consumers becoming more risk-averse.45 At the same 
time, the economy in the United States has become more complex, 
technology-driven,46 and service-based,47 arguably necessitating more 
workers being licensed. 
In 2017, the U.S. Department of Labor found in its Current Population 
Survey (CPS) that 22% of those employed in the United States had an 
occupational license.48 This statistic is in line with previous recent 
estimates, ranging from 20% to 29%, of how many workers in the U.S. 
labor force have occupational licenses.49 Table 1 below is based on the 
CPS and lists the number of persons in the United States in major 
occupational groupings where occupational licensing is common.50  
                                                     
44. Marc T. Law & Sukko Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the 
Emergence of Occupational Licensing, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 726–27 (2005) (arguing that evidence 
from the Progressive era indicates that licensing spread mostly not because practitioners worked to 
restrict competition, but because of specialization, urbanization, and advances in knowledge that 
made it difficult for consumers to judge the quality of professional services). More recently, much of 
the demand for increasing the stringency of licensing requirements for accounting, real estate 
appraisers, and stock brokers came from the government in the wake of financial crisis. See infra 
section V.A. 
45. It is difficult to quantify whether society has become more risk adverse. However, society has 
certainly focused on new risks, such as the dangers of technology, which may be perceived to be 
mitigated through occupational licensing. See EUGENE ROSA, AARON MCCRIGHT & ORTWIN RENN, 
THE RISK SOCIETY REVISITED: SOCIAL THEORY AND RISK GOVERNANCE 3 (2013).  
46. KLEINER, supra note 1, at 63 (noting that as certain occupations adopted more complex 
technology, the labor force required higher-quality and standardized labor). 
47. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that the share of workers in services, which 
are more likely to be licensed than in industry, has increased since the 1950s).  
48. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Data on Certifications and 
Licenses, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www.bls.gov/cps/certifications-and-
licenses.htm [https://perma.cc/HN8D-8UDT] [hereinafter BLS TABLE 53] (follow “PDF” hyperlink 
for “Certification and licensing status of the employed by occupation” annual table). Another 3% 
were occupationally certified but had no occupational license. Id. 
49. Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 5; GITTLEMAN, KLEE, & KLEINER, supra note 5. 
50. BLS TABLE 53, supra note 48. 
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Table 1: 
Number of Persons Employed in Select Occupational Fields and 
Number and Percent with an Occupational License (2017)51 
 
Occupation Number 
Employed  
Number 
Licensed 
Percent 
Licensed  
Healthcare practitioners 9,141,000 6,691,000 73.2% 
Legal occupations 1,827,000 1,140,000 62.4% 
Education, training, and 
library occupations 9,215,000 4,690,000 50.9% 
Healthcare support 
occupations 3,506,000 1,620,000 46.2% 
Protective service 
occupations 3,113,000 1,108,000 35.6% 
Community and social 
services occupations 2,635,000 848,000 32.2% 
Personal care and service 
occupations 5,939,000 1,675,000 28.2% 
Architecture and engineering 
occupations 3,224,000 719,000 22.3% 
Life, physical, and social 
science occupations 1,431,000 338,000 23.6% 
Transportation and material 
moving occupations 9,445,000 1,757,000 18.6% 
Management, business, and 
financial operations 
occupations 
25,379,000 4,822,010 19.0% 
Natural resources, 
construction, and 
maintenance occupations 
14,193,000 1,342,000 16.5% 
Total Employed Workforce 153,337,000 33,734,000 22.0% 
                                                     
51. Id. 
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Although critics of occupational licensing often highlight seemingly 
absurd licensing requirements imposed by some states, such as for florists 
or interior designers,52 this table shows that most workers in the United 
States with an occupational license work in fields more often connoted 
with licensing, such as health care, education, law, social services, and 
protective services. 
While the CPS is the most authoritative data currently available on 
occupational licensing, it does have shortcomings. The CPS uses 
expansive occupational categories. For instance, the survey finds that 
62.4% of those in “legal occupations” have an occupational license.53 
However, the category of “legal occupations” includes paralegals and 
legal assistants.54 If only practicing lawyers had been asked in the survey 
(about 1.14 million persons), the number of those licensed would likely 
have been close to 100%.55 
The above CPS data can also be misleading in other ways. In numerous 
occupations where licensing is mandatory for certain occupational 
activities, it is nonetheless common for many in the occupation not to be 
licensed. For example, to become an accountant one does not have to be 
licensed, but one does have to be licensed to be a certified public 
accountant (CPA), allowing the practitioner to perform certain auditing 
activities that are barred to others.56 Occupational licensing requirements 
may still significantly shape the training of unlicensed practitioners in 
these occupations.57 
                                                     
52. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 33–35 (recommending removing or reducing needless 
occupational licensing barriers); KLEINER, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICIES, supra 
note 10, at 5 (noting no seeming rationale for licensing requirements for interior designers, travel 
guides, or auctioneers). 
53. BLS TABLE 53, supra note 48. 
54. For a full list of occupations included under the category “legal occupations,” see Labor Force 
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm [https://perma.cc/LDQ5-QGJH] [hereinafter BLS TABLE 11B]. 
55. Id. (detailing number of lawyers in the United States in 2016).  
56. Only CPAs can perform mandatory audits of publicly traded U.S. companies. Frequently Asked 
Questions FAQs - Become a CPA, AM. INST. CPAS, 
http://www.aicpa.org/BECOMEACPA/FAQS/Pages/FAQs.aspx [https://perma.cc/HTW7-N3QG]. 
Similarly, engineers must be licensed to provide services in the market, but most practicing engineers 
are not personally licensed, instead working under an engineer who is licensed. Christopher Gearon, 
Mandated Master’s Degrees Could Change the Engineering Game, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 
(Mar. 17, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-
engineering-schools/articles/2014/03/17/mandated-masters-degrees-could-change-the-engineering-
game (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (noting that about 20% of all engineers are professionally licensed). 
57. For example, to become a professional engineer, one must, among other qualifications, earn a 
four-year degree from an accredited engineering program. Graduates of these programs who do not 
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Occupational licensing requirements also significantly vary by State. 
Counselors, for instance, may or may not need a license depending on the 
type of counseling they do and the state in which they work.58 The CPS 
data therefore might not show the pervasiveness of licensing in some 
fields in certain states. 
Finally, the CPS data suffer from differing perceptions about what is 
an occupational license. For example, the CPS data find that about 
1.76 million workers in the transportation sector have a license. Yet, an 
estimated 3.5 million truck drivers are in the country, almost all of whom 
presumably have a commercial driver’s license.59 The CPS survey asks 
workers whether “you have a currently active professional . . . state or 
industry license.”60 Truck drivers may have answered “no” to this 
question because they do not view their vehicular license as a 
“professional license.” Yet little conceptual difference exists between 
having a license to drive a truck versus having a license to cut hair: in 
either case, one must pass a test to receive the license and may lose it if 
found violating certain standards. 
The point of the CPS data provided in Table 1 is not to get lost in 
debates over exactly how many people in which occupations have 
occupational licenses in the United States. Rather, it is to show the major 
fields in which occupational licensing is common and its general 
pervasiveness across different realms of the workforce. This 
pervasiveness, and particularly its use in certain occupations, has led to 
frequent criticism that the next section briefly details. 
B. Criticism 
Academics, activists, and policymakers generally make two interlinked 
arguments against occupational licensing. First, they argue that licensing 
requirements are frequently overly expansive and restrictive.61 Second, 
                                                     
ultimately become a licensed professional engineer will nonetheless have their education shaped by 
their school meeting the requirements of this accreditation. See What Is a PE?, NAT’L SOC’Y PROF. 
ENGINEERS, https://www.nspe.org/resources/licensure/what-pe [https://perma.cc/N3VL-RWKS]; 
About ABET, ABET, http://www.abet.org/about-abet/ [https://perma.cc/2S55-32K9].  
58. For example, licensing requirements for rehabilitation counselors vary by state. How to Become 
a Rehabilitation Counselor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (July 13, 2018), 
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/community-and-social-service/rehabilitation-counselors.htm#tab-4 
[https://perma.cc/CKL8-YFCZ]. 
59. BLS TABLE 11B, supra note 54. 
60. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/cps/certifications-and-licenses-faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/5HAB-X7BY].  
61. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 (recommending removing or reducing needless 
occupational licensing barriers). 
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that occupational licensing’s traditional self-regulation can lead to rent-
seeking behavior by practitioners.62 These arguments are detailed in this 
section. 
Critics point to several adverse consequences of overly burdensome 
licensing requirements. Perhaps the most widespread criticism is that such 
restrictions are anticompetitive, creating barriers that drive up the price of 
labor and generate higher costs for consumers.63 This argument has a long 
lineage. Adam Smith warned that laws that regulate occupations can 
create unhealthy monopolies,64 and Milton Friedman devoted his 
dissertation and a chapter of Capitalism and Freedom to detailing the 
adverse consequences of occupational licensing.65 More recently, 
economists like Morris Kleiner have charted in more detail how licensing 
can increase the price of services and decrease labor mobility.66 
Critics of occupational licensing have also pointed to other damaging 
effects of licensing requirements. Libertarians, for instance, claim that 
licensing not only has negative effects on the economy such as increasing 
prices for services, but also reduces the economic freedom of both 
workers and consumers.67 This rights-based perspective opposes 
occupational licensing because it constrains human choice, regardless of 
whether occupational licensing has a positive or negative effect on the 
economy. 
Just as libertarians have criticized occupational licensing for restricting 
economic freedom, some progressive advocates have criticized it for 
perpetuating social hierarchy.68 Those with the fewest resources are 
frequently the least equipped to undertake the educational and testing 
requirements necessary for a license.69 These requirements have also been 
                                                     
62. Id. at 29–30 (arguing that licensing requirements are frequently created by practitioners to keep 
out competition).  
63. KLEINER, supra note 1, at 59–62, 66–68.  
64. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 69–70 (1976) (“The exclusive privileges 
of . . . statutes of apprenticeship, and all those laws which restrain, in particular employments . . . are 
a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may frequently . . . keep the market price of particular 
commodities above the natural price, and maintain both the wages of the labor and the profits of the 
stock employed about them somewhat above their natural rate.”) 
65. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & SIMON KUZNETS, INCOME FROM INDEPENDENT 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1945) (published version of Milton Friedman’s dissertation); see also 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 137–60. 
66. KLEINER, supra note 1, at 59–62, 66–68. 
67. For example, the Institute for Justice, a leading advocate for reducing occupational licensing, 
has within its mandate to “secure economic liberty.” CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 200.  
68. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 35–38. 
69. DAVID HARRINGTON & JARED TREBER, INST. FOR JUSTICE, DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE: HOW 
INTERIOR DESIGNERS USE GOVERNMENT POWER TO EXCLUDE MINORITIES & BURDEN CUSTOMERS 
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used in the past to purposely exclude marginalized social groups, like 
African-Americans,70 and today frequently limit the ability of those with 
criminal backgrounds and immigrants to enter the labor force.71 And 
where occupational licensing has the effect of increasing prices, the poor 
are generally in the worst position to pay, limiting their ability to buy 
needed services.72 
To combat overly expansive or restrictive licensing requirements, these 
critics have generally recommended that they be targeted more narrowly, 
replaced with less restrictive regulatory options, like certification or 
registration, or eliminated entirely.73 Significantly, some policymakers 
have claimed licensing restrictions should only be allowed where they 
protect the public from harm. For example, the American Legislative 
Exchange Council, an influential membership group of state legislators 
that supports free markets, has promoted model legislation that would 
require states to allow licensing only when it can be shown to protect 
against a “present and recognizable harm to the public health or safety” 
and is the least restrictive option.74 
                                                     
(2009) (concluding that minorities and older people are less likely to have a college degree and so are 
more likely to be excluded from states where there is a licensing requirement for interior designers). 
70. Richard B. Freeman, The Effect of Occupational Licensure on Black Occupational Attainment, 
in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 166, 175 (1980) (concluding that licensing laws 
were used discriminatorily from the 1890s to the 1950s to exclude African-Americans from licensed 
occupations and craft unions but that by 1970 such laws had at best a modest effect on black 
employment). 
71. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 35–38. 
72. See, e.g., BRADLEY LARSEN, STANFORD UNIV. & NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND QUALITY: DISTRIBUTIONAL AND HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS IN THE 
TEACHING PROFESSION 4 (2015), 
https://web.stanford.edu/~bjlarsen/Larsen%20(2015)%20Occupational%20licensing%20and%20qu
ality.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNQ9-5BZF] (explaining that stricter licensing requirements for teachers 
lead to higher output quality but improvements disproportionately accrue with high-income school 
districts and arguing that this outcome may be a result of low-income school districts responding to 
higher-priced teachers with larger class sizes or emergency-certified teachers). 
73. See, e.g., CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 (recommending removing or reducing needless 
occupational licensing barriers); FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 144–46 (suggesting that registration and 
certification could be alternatives to licensing in some contexts); WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 
8, at 44 (discussing certification, registration, and mandatory bonding as alternatives to occupational 
licensing). In actual practice, “certification” and “registration” may be used as synonyms with the 
term “licensed,” which can cause confusion. For example, a “certified” public accountant or a 
“registered” nurse is simply another name for licensure. See BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, BARBARA F. 
ESSER & DANIEL H. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 8 (1973).   
74. The Occupational Licensing Defense Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/the-occupational-licensing-defense-act-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/DEB2-VKPL]. 
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The argument that occupational licensing is overly expansive is often 
coupled with the concern that it is particularly susceptible to regulatory 
capture because in many fields members of the occupation play a formal 
role in regulating the occupation itself by sitting on occupational licensing 
boards.75 Concerns about self-regulation of occupations have gained 
particular traction as the regulatory state has become more sophisticated, 
so regulation of occupations directly by the state, without as central a role 
for practitioners, now seems more feasible and, for many, more 
legitimate.76 As such, where occupational licensing is necessary, some 
policymakers maintain it should be controlled not by practitioners, but by 
technocrats or public members of licensing boards who are viewed as 
more likely to adopt licensing requirements only when they are in the 
interests of consumers or the public.77 
C. States’ Regulation of Occupational Licensing 
Most observers have traditionally viewed occupational licensing as 
primarily controlled by states and localities.78 For example, when the 
Obama White House issued a report in 2015 aimed at curtailing the use of 
occupational licensing it declared that “licensing policy falls in the 
purview of individual States.”79 The report did not mention any substantial 
federal role in occupational licensing and tailored all of its 
recommendations for state and local governments.80 Leading scholars on 
occupational licensing have similarly taken the view that occupational 
                                                     
75. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 140–41; KLEINER, supra note 1, at 59. 
76. See, e.g., DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE 241–43 (2009) (noting that in the legal profession the federal government has 
become a much more active player in its regulation, reducing its insularity and autonomy); Nick 
Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership, Access, and 
Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 52–53 (2016) (arguing that the legal profession has 
begun to be seen more like other commercial services and that the government has increasingly 
encroached on its regulation). 
77. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 52 (advocating for more public membership 
on occupational licensing boards).  
78. For example, Justice Alito in his dissent in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 
noted that “[i]n 1890, the regulation of the practice of medicine and dentistry was regarded as falling 
squarely within the States’ sovereign police power.” 574 U.S __, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1119 (2015) (Alito, 
J., dissenting). See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 129 (1889) (explaining that states have 
long used occupational licensing requirements to provide for the general welfare of the people in 
upholding a Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge to West Virginia’s medicine licensing 
requirements). 
79. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 41.  
80. Id. at 41–43. The report merely made mention of relatively minor initiatives by the federal 
government already undertaken to improve licensing at the state level. Id. at 54–55. 
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licensing is primarily a state and local issue and largely ignored the role 
of federal actors.81 
It is easy to see why this perspective has dominated. The federal 
government has not acted to preempt the field for occupational licensing 
as it has for other issues, such as labor laws with the National Labor 
Relations Act.82 Nor has the Constitution been read to preempt state action 
in the field, as with foreign affairs.83 Instead, state governments generally 
still decide what activities to license and then frequently delegate the 
actual implementation of licensing requirements to volunteer, or quasi-
volunteer, boards of practitioners operating at the state level.84 These 
boards, which may have public representatives, set and enforce standards 
for the occupation.85 State administrative procedure acts apply to the 
actions of these boards, requiring notice and comment for new regulations 
and a hearing if a license is to be taken away or suspended.86 
There is, of course, variation to this general model of states delegating 
to occupational licensing boards even where states are in control. For 
example, truck drivers are regulated directly by state authorities with no 
delegation to a licensing board.87 Similarly, the highest court of a state, 
                                                     
81. KLEINER, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing that Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 129 (1889), 
gave authority over occupational licensing to the states). 
82. See, e.g., Machinists v. Wis. Emp. Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (finding that federal 
labor policy precluded a state from enjoining a union and its members from striking); San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (finding that even when the National Labor Relations 
Board did not act, the National Labor Relations Act precluded states from taking actions over which 
the Board would otherwise have jurisdiction).  
83. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (1999) (finding Massachusetts’s 
Burma sanctions law to be preempted by federal control over foreign relations); Zschernig v. Miller, 
389 U.S. 429 (1968) (finding an Oregon escheat law that operated to prevent inheritance by citizens 
of Communist countries unconstitutional because it preempted the U.S. foreign relations power).  
84. Regulatory arrangements between states and amongst different occupations can be diverse. 
Some boards are appointed by the government, others by the legislature, and some elected by the 
profession. A staff may aid the board in its functions. For an overview of these possible arrangements, 
see COUNCIL ON LICENSURE, ENF’T & REGULATION (CLEAR), FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING 
CONSISTENT DESCRIPTIONS OF REGULATORY MODELS: UNITED STATES 3 (2006), 
http://www.clearhq.org/resources/Regulatory_Model_United_States.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YU8-
U9KQ] [hereinafter CLEAR]. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. For a detailed overview of how the Administrative Procedure Act of Texas informs the 
actions of occupational licensing boards in Texas, see ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
HANDBOOK (2018), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/files/divisions/general-
oag/AdministrativeLawHandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/64UH-S6GF]. 
87. Commercial Driver’s License Program, FED. MOTOR CARRIER ADMIN., 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/registration/commercial-drivers-license [https://perma.cc/6ECJ-VZFT] 
(explaining that a commercial driver’s license must be obtained from one’s home state’s department 
of motor vehicles). 
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rather than a licensing board or the state executive, regulates lawyers, at 
least formally.88 
Yet this traditional broad-brush account of state control over 
occupational licensing overlooks three critical ways licensing is governed 
at the federal level. 
First, and not explored in detail in this Article, this state-centric view 
misses the significant role played by national professional associations. 
These associations frequently lobby legislatures to license specific 
occupations in the first place and work with licensing boards to adopt 
model rules or best practices that these national associations promulgate.89 
As such, national professional associations provide expertise for states’ 
licensing efforts and play an important coordinating role, helping to 
harmonize occupational licensing rules across states.90 They can even 
become formally involved in implementing regulation, as in the case of 
medical professional associations’ role in accrediting medical schools.91 
Second, and again not explored in this Article, national organizations 
are created by states to coordinate standards in particular fields. For 
example, the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and 
Surveying (NCEES) is a non-profit organization that is composed of the 
legally constituted state boards that regulate engineering and/or 
                                                     
88. For example, the New York State Board of Law Examiners is responsible for administering the 
bar exam and operates under the auspices of the New York State Court of Appeals. N.Y. ST. BD. OF 
L. EXAM’RS, http://www.nybarexam.org/Default.html [https://perma.cc/9K3L-N9BR]. In New York, 
complaints against lawyers are heard by disciplinary and grievance committees appointed by 
respective appellate divisions of the judicial system. Attorney Grievance Committees, N.Y. ST. 
UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/attorneys/grievance/ [https://perma.cc/M44X-YXPG]. 
89. Alan B. Krueger & Morris M. Kleiner, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing 
3 (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 174, 2008) (noting that professional 
associations lobby state legislatures for licensing requirements).  
90. For example, the American Bar Association promulgates the Model Rules of Professional 
Ethics that serve as a model for the ethics rules of most states. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
ABA (Oct. 25, 2018), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ 
model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html [https://perma.cc/42N3-AC48]. 
91. For example, most states require that practitioners of medicine graduate from a medical school 
accredited by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME). Scope and Purpose of 
Accreditation, LIAISON COMMITTEE ON MED. EDUC., http://lcme.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/YC5N-
KW7W]. The LCME is, in turn, jointly sponsored by the American Medical Association (AMA) and 
the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC). Relationship with Sponsors, LIAISON 
COMMITTEE ON MED. EDUC., http://lcme.org/about/sponsors/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018). The AMA 
is a membership organization of physicians and state and national medical societies, while the AAMC 
is a membership organization of medical colleges in the country. About the AAMC, ASS’N AM. MED. 
CS., https://www.aamc.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/27YH-8XM8]; see also About Us, AM. MED. 
ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/about [https://perma.cc/HP95-GYC2]. 
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surveying.92 It provides national exams for engineers and surveyors as 
well as model rules and laws for states and state boards.93 
Third, and the focus of this Article, the traditional state-centric account 
of occupational licensing misses another key component of national 
governance—namely, the increasingly prominent role that the federal 
government plays in regulating occupational licensing. The next Part 
explores the interventions of the federal courts, while the last Part turns to 
Congress and the Executive, suggesting that these two branches are 
generally better suited than the judiciary to regulate licensing at the federal 
level. 
II. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
JURISPRUDENCE 
As both occupational licensing and critiques of it have become more 
pervasive, the federal courts have produced a more fully developed 
jurisprudence regulating its use. This Part focuses on how the federal 
courts have interpreted antitrust law and the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to place significant limits on both when and how 
occupational licensing restrictions can be used. Significantly, in doing so, 
the courts have explicitly or implicitly promoted a free market view of 
licensing in which licensing is justified only when it clearly protects the 
public from harm and professional self-regulation is viewed as 
synonymous with regulatory capture. 
A. Antitrust 
Legal scholars have long noted that the actions of occupational 
licensing boards can be in tension with U.S. antitrust law.94 After all, 
members of occupational licensing boards are frequently also market 
                                                     
92. NAT’L COUNCIL OF EXAM’RS FOR ENG’G & SURVEYING, BYLAWS 1 (2015), 
http://ncees.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2015-Bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/J24E-7R2E] (see 
Article 1). The NCEES’s Board of Directors is elected from those who already sit on state licensing 
boards. About, NAT’L COUNCIL EXAMINERS FOR ENGINEERING & SURVEYING, 
http://ncees.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/PT3E-NKRS]. 
93. About, NAT’L COUNCIL EXAMINERS FOR ENGINEERING & SURVEYING, supra note 92. 
94. See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed 
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1137–39 (2014) (describing how 
prominent antitrust scholars agree that occupational licensing boards should only be given antitrust 
immunity if they are held publicly accountable for anticompetitive behavior); Einer Elhauge, The 
Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 668–69 (1991) (noting that there is a tension 
between the consumer welfare pro-competition impulse of antitrust law and occupational licensing). 
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participants in the fields that they are regulating.95 Occupational licensing 
boards routinely make regulatory decisions that are by their nature 
anticompetitive, such as making requirements to become a practitioner 
more stringent (thus raising barriers for new entrants into the market) or 
taking away the license of practitioners who violate professional rules 
(thereby eliminating competitors). However, the United States Supreme 
Court’s doctrine of state-action immunity, articulated in Parker v. 
Brown,96 generally protects actions of state and local governments from 
antitrust scrutiny.97 The doctrine was also historically seen to provide 
broad protection to actions of occupational licensing boards (which have 
been viewed as state agencies) as long as the boards derived their authority 
to act from the state.98 
Even so, this broad protection has its limits. Professional associations, 
in particular, have faced antitrust scrutiny in the past. For example, in 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,99 the Court found in a unanimous decision 
that the professions could be regulated by antitrust laws because they were 
engaged in a “trade or commerce.”100 As such, it held that minimum fee 
schedules promoted by a state bar association violated antitrust laws 
because the state bar association acted to enforce these schedules even 
though they were not required to do so by the state.101 Similarly, in 
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,102 the Court 
struck down a professional association’s ban on competitive bidding.103 
                                                     
95. Id. 
96. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
97. Id. at 350–52 (holding that an anticompetitive marketing program which “derived its authority 
and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state” was not a violation of the Sherman Act 
because the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit a State from imposing a restraint as an act of 
government). 
98. Justice Alito noted in dissent in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC that “[i]n 
Parker, the Court held that the Sherman Act does not prevent the States from continuing their age-old 
practice of enacting measures, such as licensing requirements, that are designed to protect the public 
health and welfare.” 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Town 
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985) (noting “[i]n cases in which the actor is a 
state agency, it is likely that active state supervision would also not be required . . . .”). 
99. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
100. Id. at 787–88 (finding that lawyers, although a learned profession, were engaged in a “trade 
or commerce” and so could be regulated by antitrust laws). 
101. Id. at 790 (“We need not inquire further into the state-action question because it cannot fairly 
be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules required the anticompetitive 
activities of either respondent.”). 
102. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
103. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (finding that the National 
Society of Professional Engineers canon of ethics banning competitive bidding violated the Sherman 
Act); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (finding that a policy of a dental 
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Outside the occupational licensing context, the United States Supreme 
Court has also allowed for antitrust scrutiny where the state has delegated 
regulatory authority to other actors in some situations.104 Famously, in 
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,105 the 
Court found that the state of California’s delegation of fixing wine prices 
to wine producers and wholesalers violated the Sherman Act. In the case, 
the Court created a two-part test for determining whether Parker state-
action immunity would shield third parties.106 This two-part test was 
summarized in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,107 where the Court held 
that “[a] state law or regulatory scheme cannot be the basis for antitrust 
immunity unless, first, the State has articulated a clear policy to allow the 
anticompetitive conduct, and second, the State provides active supervision 
of [the] anticompetitive conduct.”108 
Applying this logic, the Court significantly expanded the historic reach 
of antitrust law in relation to occupational licensing boards in North 
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners. The North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners is a state agency that licenses dentists in the state and 
is comprised mostly of practicing dentists.109 It sent cease and desist letters 
to non-dentist teeth whiteners that operated in shopping malls and other 
locations, claiming that they were practicing dentistry without a license.110 
State law was ambiguous about whether teeth whitening actually 
constituted dentistry and the FTC filed a case against the Dental Board, 
labeling the Board’s actions anticompetitive.111 In response, the Dental 
                                                     
association to require dentist members to withhold x-rays from insurance companies violated antitrust 
law); Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding that doctors in a medical 
society fixing maximum fees violated antitrust law). But see Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) 
(rejecting an antitrust challenge to admission rules to the Arizona State Bar because the Arizona 
Supreme Court itself maintained ultimate control over who was to be admitted even if it delegated 
authority to write these rules to a commission of lawyers). 
104. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (holding that the state action doctrine does not protect 
Oregon physicians from federal antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer review 
committees). 
105. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
106. Id. at 111–14. 
107. 504 U.S. 621 (1992). 
108. Id. at 631. 
109. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs. v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1110 (noting that state law was silent on whether teeth whitening constituted the practice 
of dentistry). 
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Board claimed the cease and desist letters sent by the FTC should be 
considered state action and be provided antitrust immunity.112 
In a six-to-three decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
found that the first part of the Midcal state-action immunity test was met 
because the state had a clear policy of prohibiting the unauthorized 
practice of dentistry.113 However, the second part of the test—active state 
supervision—was not. Kennedy emphasized that “[l]imits on state-action 
immunity are most essential when the state seeks to delegate its regulatory 
power to active market participants, for established ethical standards may 
blend with private anticompetitive motives in a way difficult even for 
market participants to discern.”114 He found that the state did not actively 
supervise or explicitly sanction the Dental Board’s decision that teeth 
whitening was to be included in the unauthorized practice of dentistry or 
the sending of the cease and desist letters to the teeth whiteners.115 
Because active market participants controlled the Board, its actions 
deserved a heightened level of scrutiny by the Court and as a result it 
failed to meet the second prong of the Midcal test.116 
In his decision, Justice Kennedy did not define what would have 
constituted active state supervision, claiming it varied by context.117 
However, he found it required at least three components, all of which were 
absent in the case of the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners’ 
actions: (1) “The [state] supervisor must review the substance of the 
anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce 
it;”118 (2) “the [state] supervisor must have the power to veto or modify 
particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy;”119 and 
                                                     
112. Id. (“In this case the Board argues its members were invested by North Carolina with the 
power of the State and that, as a result, the Board’s actions are cloaked with Parker immunity.”).  
113. Id. (“The parties have assumed that the clear articulation requirement is satisfied, and we do 
the same.”). 
114. Id. at 1111. Justice Kennedy continued, “[t]he lesson is clear: Midcal’s active supervision test 
is an essential prerequisite of Parker immunity for any nonsovereign entity—public or private—
controlled by active market participants.” Id. at 1113. In this way, the Court’s reasoning echoed the 
writings of legal antitrust scholars. Id. at 1116; see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 94 (arguing 
occupational licensing boards dominated by market participants should face antitrust scrutiny). 
115. Id. at 1116. 
116. Id. (noting that “[t]he Board does not claim that the State exercised active, or indeed any, 
supervision over its conduct regarding nondentist teeth whiteners; and, as a result, no specific 
supervisory systems can be reviewed here”). 
117. Id. (“It suffices to note that the inquiry regarding active supervision is flexible and context-
dependent.”). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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(3) “the mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute 
for a decision by the State.”120 
As Justice Alito noted in his dissent, this decision signaled a shift in the 
Court’s jurisprudence.121 Alito argued that the Midcal test should not have 
been applied to the North Carolina Dental Board as the two-prong test had 
only previously been applied to situations where the state delegated power 
to private actors.122 However, the Dental Board was a state agency created 
by the state that acted at its behest, even if the Board was comprised of 
market participants.123 
The North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners decision has far-
reaching implications for the regulation of occupational licensing. Under 
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, regulatory actions of 
licensing boards that are controlled by practitioners can now come under 
antitrust scrutiny if they are not actively supervised by the state.124 
Because the work of many licensing boards involves limiting output by 
placing restrictions on who can and cannot practice in an occupation, the 
Court opened up unsupervised licensing boards to antitrust challenges.125 
After the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners decision, a wave 
of private action suits against various state occupational licensing 
authorities arose.126 In one closely followed case, a telemedicine company 
                                                     
120. Id.  
121. Id. at 1117. 
122. Id.  
123. Id. at 1117–18 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under Parker, the Sherman Act . . . do[es] not apply to 
state agencies; the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is a state agency; and that is the end of 
the matter.”). 
124. Id. at 1116. 
125. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) (noting that where “the challenged 
practices create a limitation on output . . . our cases have held that such limitations are unreasonable 
restraints of trade”). 
126. These suits have had varying success. See, e.g., Petrie v. Va. Bd. of Med., 658 Fed. App’x 352 
(4th Cir. 2016) (dismissing antitrust challenge by chiropractor who had been punished by Board of 
Medicine for offering services that required medical license because restraint on one practitioner not 
enough to account for restraint on trade and could not show agreement among board members to 
restrain trade); Henry v. N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15CV831, 2017 WL 401234 
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2017) (allowing for antitrust suit to proceed against acupuncture licensing board 
for warning physical therapists not to perform dry needling); Wallen v. St. Louis Metro. Taxicab 
Comm’n, No. 4:15cv1432, 2016 WL 5846825 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2016) (finding that Uber could 
proceed in an antitrust suit against a taxicab commission for denying it access to a market); Colindres 
v. Battle, No. 1:15-CV-2843-SCJ, 2016 WL 42589330 (N.D. Ga. June 6, 2016) (finding that an 
antitrust suit against a Georgia dental board for threatening to close teeth whiteners survived a motion 
to dismiss); Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., 157 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D. Conn. Jan. 20, 2016) 
(dismissing an antitrust challenge by a veterinarian who had been disciplined by the state board for 
using a vaccination procedure not prescribed by the board); Axcess Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Easterling, 
No. 3:14cv112, 2015 WL 5642975 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 24, 2015) (antitrust challenge to rules requiring 
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brought suit against the Texas Medical Board for a regulation that barred 
physicians from treating a patient without a prior in-person physical 
exam.127 The district court granted an injunction against the regulation, 
and the Texas Medical Board later dropped its appeal, seemingly fearing 
that the circuit court would rule that the regulation did not have state 
action immunity.128 
In response to the Court’s decision, many states have also increased 
supervision of occupational licensing boards. They have adopted a variety 
of tactics to do so, which may or may not actually meet Justice Kennedy’s 
vague and context-specific standard of supervision.129 For example, in 
California, the Attorney General has held that any regulatory decision of 
a state licensing board must be reviewed by a state official.130 In 
Oklahoma, the applicable regulations must be reviewed by the Attorney 
General.131 Several states have passed or introduced legislation to change 
how the actions of regulatory boards are reviewed.132 In Connecticut, 
legislation was passed in 2015 that required regulatory boards related to 
health to notify the Department of Public Health if they receive a 
complaint related to a regulatory decision and then abide by the holding 
of the Department of Public Health Commissioner on the matter.133 In 
2017, Mississippi passed a law that created an occupational licensing 
                                                     
physician ownership of pain management clinics); Voluntary Dismissal, CoesterVMS.com, Inc. v. 
Va. Real Estate Appraiser Bd., 1:15-cv-00980 (E.D. Va. Oct. 6, 2015) (voluntary dismissal of antitrust 
challenge to denial of licensure due to past conduct); Complaint, WSPTN Corp. v. Tenn. Dep’t of 
Health, No. 3:15-cv-00840 (M.D. Tenn. July 30, 2015) (claiming restraint in trade in hearing aid 
market because of regulations by licensing board); Terry Carter, LegalZoom Resolves $10.5M 
Antitrust Suit Against North Carolina State Bar, ABA. J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_resolves_10.5m_antitrust_suit_against_north_c
arolina_state_bar/ [https://perma.cc/9DWQ-9R7Q] (detailing LegalZoom antitrust settlement with 
North Carolina State Bar that allows it to operate in state). 
127. See Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529 (W.D. Tex. 2015).  
128. See Michelle Casady, Texas Medical Board Drops 5th Circ. Telemedicine Appeal, LAW360 
(Oct. 18, 2016, 3:34 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/852571/texas-medical-board-drops-5th-
circ-telemedicine-appeal (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
129. N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116. 
130. See FTC, AM. MED. ASS’N & MANATT, STATE ACTION ISSUES IN THE WAKE OF NORTH 
CAROLINA BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS 19–20 (2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/healthlaw/14_state_action_issues_in_
the_wake_of_the_north_carolina_dental_board_decision.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3HK-ZNPB]. 
131. Id. 
132. Id.  
133. JAMES ORLANDO, CONN. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS V. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2016), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/rpt/pdf/2016-R-0041.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B26-8857]. 
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review commission that actively supervises many of the state’s licensing 
boards.134 The California Supreme Court went so far as to strip the 
Committee of Bar Examiners of the power to determine the passing score 
on the bar exam so as to help avoid potential antitrust liability.135 
As such, the U.S. Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence has 
significantly shaped how occupational licensing is regulated. In response 
to an increasingly aggressive federal judiciary, states have added a variety 
of forms of state control over licensing decisions and reduced independent 
occupational self-regulation. 
B. First Amendment 
Under Parker, explicit state action (such as legislation requiring 
licensing for an occupation in the first place) is immune from antitrust 
scrutiny.136 However, this is not true in the free speech context. Federal 
courts can, and frequently do, strike down occupational licensing 
requirements that violate the First Amendment even if the state has 
authorized these requirements through legislation or active supervision. 
The Court’s free speech jurisprudence, as it relates to occupational 
licensing, can be divided into that protecting the speech of licensed 
practitioners and that protecting the speech of unlicensed market 
participants. Amidst its developing First Amendment doctrine, the 
Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence and its interventions to protect 
the speech of unlicensed market participants has arguably, at times, led to 
the constitutionalization of a free market ideology in the occupational 
licensing context. 
A licensed practitioner’s speech has traditionally received different 
levels of protection whether it is political speech, commercial speech, or 
“professional” speech. A practitioner’s political speech generally receives 
robust protection under the First Amendment and is not the focus here.137 
                                                     
134. Nick Sibila, New Mississippi Law Will Reign in Licensing Boards, Regulate State Regulators, 
FORBES (April 23, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2017/04/13/new-
mississippi-law-will-rein-in-licensing-boards-regulate-state-regulators/#13d65b01715b 
[https://perma.cc/9J69-2CZG]. 
135. Staci Zaretsky, California Bar Examiners Stripped of Authority to Determine Passing Score 
on State Bar Exam, ABOVE THE LAW (July 11, 2017, 12:13 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2017/07/california-bar-examiners-stripped-of-authority-to-determine-
passing-score-on-state-bar-exam/ [https://perma.cc/8T22-EY35]. 
136. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–52 (1943). 
137. For example, in NAACP v. Button, the Court struck down provisions of law in Virginia aimed 
at curtailing the activities of the NAACP that banned lawyers from the “improper solicitation of any 
legal or professional business” because these provisions operated to infringe on protected political 
speech. 371 U.S. 415, 419, 442–44 (1963). In Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court held that 
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Historically, a practitioner’s professional speech—i.e., where a client 
relies on professional advice—has been given very limited First 
Amendment protection. For instance, a doctor generally has no free 
speech defense when providing advice to a patient that does not conform 
to accepted standards of professional practice and, as a result, doctors can 
lose their licenses or face tort liability.138 However, this traditional 
understanding of the professional speech doctrine was cast into question 
by the Court in 2018 in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. 
Becerra.139 In the five to four decision, the Court struck down on First 
Amendment grounds a California requirement that licensed and 
unlicensed pregnancy clinics must inform patients that the state provides 
free or low-cost abortion services. 
In the majority decision, Justice Thomas rejected the argument that 
such notice requirements were “professional speech” that was immune 
from First Amendment scrutiny.140 Thomas noted that the Court has never 
officially recognized “professional speech” as a separate category of 
speech, even if lower courts have.141 He indicated state regulation of 
professions would only receive immunity from free speech scrutiny in two 
instances. First, immunity would be granted when states regulate 
“professional conduct” and it only “incidentally burden[s] speech,” such 
as through torts for professional malpractice.142 Second, states could 
“require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in 
their commercial speech” if the disclosure related to services the regulated 
entity provided.143 
                                                     
allowing licensing boards to ask prospective members of the bar whether they are members of the 
Communist Party violated their First Amendment free expression rights. 401 U.S. 1 (1971). But see 
Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (finding New York’s 
more narrowly tailored requirement that bar applicant’s state they believe in the form of government 
in the United States and are loyal to that government does not violate the First Amendment). 
138. ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 12–13 (2013) (noting that a dentist does not have a First 
Amendment defense if she offers advice to a patient based on an unaccepted theory but does if she 
offers the theory to the public). The doctor, though, may have a free speech defense if the state 
attempts to mandate that a practitioner perform an action or speech incompatible with the accepted 
standards of their professional community. See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 
YALE L.J. 1238, 1297–98 (2016) (arguing that states should not be able to compel professional 
communities to communicate speech that is incompatible with a professional community’s insights). 
139. 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
140. Id. at 8. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 9–10. 
143. Id. at 8–9. 
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Significantly, Justice Thomas’s opinion did not ultimately hinge on 
whether a category of “professional speech” exists as he ultimately held 
that California’s notice requirements did not even survive intermediate 
scrutiny.144 Also, the case is potentially distinguishable from some other 
occupational licensing contexts because it involved the state government 
compelling specific speech from a practitioner. However, the judgment 
seems to indicate the professional speech doctrine may not provide 
occupational licensing regulations the same wide protection from First 
Amendment scrutiny as in the past. Indeed, some academics have argued 
strict First Amendment scrutiny should be applied to all professional 
speech.145 
While professional speech may be subject to more First Amendment 
scrutiny in the future, the commercial speech of professionals already is 
significantly scrutinized. The Court has increasingly viewed practitioners’ 
commercial speech—such as when practitioners solicit work or advertise 
their services—as deserving of First Amendment protection. This shift has 
been deeply contested as many have viewed the professions’ traditional 
distance from the rules of the market as integral to ensuring that 
practitioners provide services to clients in a public-spirited manner.146 For 
example, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,147 the Court 
found that the solicitation of personal injury cases amongst members of a 
labor union by the union and its lawyer was protected free speech that 
could not be banned by the state.148 Justice Clark in dissenting with Justice 
Harlan, lamented that the decision’s application of the First Amendment 
                                                     
144. Id. at 14. It is not clear why Justice Thomas applied an intermediate standard in the case as 
speech classified as professional speech is exempted from First Amendment scrutiny. Potentially, he 
was responding to California’s claim that the notice requirement was at best commercial speech and 
so would be subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Cory L. Andrews, The Dog That Didn’t Bark in the 
Night: SCOTUS’s NIFLA v. Becerra and the Future of Commercial Speech, FORBES (July 5, 2018, 
11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2018/07/05/the-dog-that-didnt-bark-in-the-night-
scotuss-nifla-v-becerra-and-the-future-of-commercial-speech/#28e23f0c3ddc 
[https://perma.cc/VA46-L32P]. Notably, Justice Thomas also placed heavy emphasis on the notice 
requirements being a “content-based” regulation. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371. 
145. See Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 
67 (2016) (cited by Justice Thomas in Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375).  
146. See, e.g., Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 397–98 (1977) (Burger, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the characteristics of the legal profession, such as its code of professional ethics and its sense of public 
responsibility, are thought to suffer if restraints on advertising are diluted). 
147. 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
148. Id. at 1 (finding the State failed to show any appreciable public interest in preventing the union 
from carrying out its plan to recommend the lawyers it selects to represent injured workers).  
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“overthrows state regulation of the legal profession and relegates the 
practice of law to the level of a commercial enterprise.”149 
The following decades saw an enlargement of the Court’s commercial 
speech doctrine, further limiting the types of restrictions on market 
activity that states could place on occupations that require a license.150 In 
1976, the Court ruled in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council151 that advertisement by licensed pharmacists 
was protected commercial speech and struck down a state law that banned 
pharmacists from advertising price information.152 The Court made clear 
that these advertising restrictions concerned practitioners’ “retail” face 
more than their professional face,153 was not in itself harmful to the 
public,154 and so was not protected from First Amendment scrutiny. The 
following year, in Bates v. State of Arizona,155 the Court struck down, on 
similar grounds, an Arizona statute that barred lawyer advertisement.156 A 
series of U.S. Supreme Court cases followed that further specified what 
types of lawyer advertisement and solicitation were protected under the 
First Amendment.157 These decisions significantly restricted when the 
                                                     
149. Id. at 9. But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (finding that states 
could ban direct, in-person commercial solicitation by lawyers).  
150. For an overview of the history of the commercial speech doctrine, see Daniel Halberstam, 
Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. 
PA. L. REV. 771, 779–91 (1999); Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the 
Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (2017).  
151. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
152. Id. at 769–72 (holding that commercial speech is protected speech under the First 
Amendment). 
153. Id. at 768–69 (“[T]his case concerns the retail sale by the pharmacist more than it does his 
professional standards. Surely, any pharmacist guilty of professional dereliction that actually 
endangers his customer will promptly lose his license. . . . The advertising ban does not directly affect 
professional standards one way or the other. It affects them only through the reactions it is assumed 
people will have to the free flow of drug price information.”). 
154. Id. at 770 (“[T]his [price] information is not in itself harmful . . . .”). 
155. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
156. See id. at 381–82 (holding that advertisement by lawyers is commercial speech that is subject 
to protection by the First Amendment).  
157. See Thompson v. W. Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (striking down a restriction on 
advertising of pharmacists selling “compounded drugs” as violating the commercial speech doctrine); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disc. Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (finding that illustrations in lawyer 
advertisement were protected free speech, but full information regarding contingency fees should be 
included in advertisement); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (finding that a lawyer who listed 
categories of specialty not included in pre-specified list under state Supreme Court rule was protected 
action under First Amendment); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (finding 
solicitation of clients through letter by non-profit legal organization was protected political speech). 
But see Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (finding that although advertising by lawyers 
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state could limit advertising in medicine and law, arguably contributing to 
what many claim is an increasing commercialization of these and other 
professions.158 
Besides using free speech to invalidate professional restrictions on 
practitioners’ commercial speech, the federal judiciary has also enlarged 
First Amendment protections for unlicensed market participants and, in 
the process, struck down licensing restrictions. At least before NIFLA, 
professional speech has been categorically exempted from First 
Amendment scrutiny where there was a “personal nexus between 
professional and client” and the practitioner is exercising judgment on 
behalf of the client in a way that is tailored to their circumstances.159 As 
such, the federal courts have generally dismissed free speech challenges 
to the ability of states to require a license for occupational activities that 
involve speech.160 
That said, unlicensed market participants have generally received 
protection for their speech when they are speaking about a professional 
activity if it is to the public at large. For instance, in Lowe v. Securities 
Exchange Commission,161 the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) attempted to restrain Christopher Lowe, who was not a registered 
investment advisor, from publishing a newsletter that offered non-
personalized investment advice. The majority opinion found that the SEC 
did not have the power to do so based on an issue of statutory 
interpretation.162 Justice White, concurring, argued that Lowe’s newsletter 
was protected under the First Amendment. He claimed that when speech, 
even technical speech, is directed at the public, and not tailored to specific 
                                                     
is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, a restriction barring lawyers from soliciting 
victims of a disaster for thirty days was constitutional). 
158. See STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN 
POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE (1994) (arguing that professions are becoming commercialized); 
Robinson, supra note 76, at 52 (noting a variety of professions, and particularly lawyers, have become 
more responsive to competitive market forces as their relationship to the market becomes more like 
other occupations). 
159. See Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 133, 193 (2016) (“As a number 
of scholars have pointed out, much is excluded from the coverage of the First Amendment—meaning 
what sort of speech acts it protects at all—either in categories that First Amendment doctrine expressly 
excludes or that courts (and litigants) implicitly exclude as self-evidently not covered.”); Paul 
Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 187–88 (2015) 
(detailing the development of the personal nexus test). 
160. See, e.g., Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
regulation of fortune tellers was the regulation of professional speech and so did not violate the First 
Amendment); Locke v. Shore, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291 (N.D. Fla. 2009) (finding that a licensing 
requirement for interior designers was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny). 
161. 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
162. Id. at 209–11. 
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clients, then requiring a speaker to secure a government-issued license to 
engage in that speech is subject to First Amendment scrutiny.163 This 
reasoning has been followed in lower court decisions.164 
In Edwards v. District of Columbia,165 the D.C. Circuit used this 
distinction between public and non-public speech to strike down a 
licensing requirement for an entire occupation: tour guides. In writing for 
the Court, Judge Janice Rogers Brown found the tour guides’ speech was 
not professional speech as it was not tailored to the specific circumstances 
of each customer.166 As such, she held the licensing regime 
unconstitutional because there was no evidence that the harms the tour 
guide-licensing regime claimed to mitigate, such as tourists being 
swindled or having their welfare jeopardized by unlicensed guides, 
actually existed or could not be addressed through less restrictive 
means.167 
Significantly, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Edwards is directly at odds 
with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kagan v. City of New Orleans.168 In 
that case, the Fifth Circuit did not determine whether tour guides used 
“professional” speech or not, but instead found that tour guide licensing 
                                                     
163. Id. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (“If the government enacts generally applicable licensing 
provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice the profession, it cannot be said to have 
enacted a limitation on freedom of speech or the press subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Where 
the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to 
be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly 
acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional practice 
with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such . . . .”). 
164. See, e.g., ForSaleByOwner.com Corp. v. Zinnemann, 347 F. Supp. 2d 868, 876–79 (E.D. Cal. 
2004) (using the First Amendment to strike down requirements that “for sale by owner” websites be 
operated only by licensed real estate brokers); Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 482 (D.D.C. 
1999) (striking down registration requirements for people who publish information about 
commodities trading under the First Amendment). 
165. 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
166. Id. at 1000 n.3 (“The District’s brief suggests the tour-guide license, like licensing schemes 
for lawyers and psychiatrists, is merely an occupational license subject only to rational basis 
review. . . . The District is wrong. ‘One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and 
purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individual needs and 
circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession.’ Appellants do no such 
thing. They provide virtually identical information to each customer. . . . In any event, given the 
regulations’ incoherence, we doubt the District could survive even rational basis review.” (citations 
omitted)). 
167. Id. at 1005–09 (explaining why the alleged harms were not actual likely harms and how they 
could be mitigated in a less restrictive manner). For a full list of harms that Washington D.C. claimed 
would be mitigated by licensing tour guides, see id. at 1003.  
168. 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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in New Orleans was content neutral and promoted a substantial state 
interest and so survived free speech scrutiny.169 
Libertarians critical of occupational licensing have claimed that the 
federal judiciary’s expanding free speech doctrine in the occupational 
licensing context should lead to free speech scrutiny of all licensing 
restrictions that involve occupational speech.170 Robert Post and other 
scholars have countered that such a position would make many licensing 
requirements for a range of occupations, including doctors and lawyers, 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny.171 This could both limit the ability 
of states to create licensing requirements that involve speech and make 
these restrictions subject to constant challenge by litigants.172 In other 
words, it would constitutionalize a much more constrained and free-
market approach to the use of occupational licensing. 
C. Fourteenth Amendment 
Finally, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution have also been used to strike 
down occupational licensing requirements and promote a more libertarian 
view of when licensing should be used. 
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, a state only needs to 
meet a rational basis standard to justify these requirements under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.173 And, indeed, historically the judiciary has 
been hostile to Fourteenth Amendment occupational licensing 
                                                     
169. Id. at 562 (“New Orleans, by requiring the licensees to know the city and not be felons or drug 
addicts, has effectively promoted the government interests, and without those protections for the city 
and its visitors, the government interest would be unserved.”). 
170. Sherman, supra note 159 (arguing that the natural extension of the U.S. Supreme Court’s free 
speech jurisprudence is to apply strict scrutiny to all occupational speech). 
171. Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 
178 (2015) (arguing that the inevitable consequence of the libertarian reasoning of Paul Sherman or 
the Circuit Court in Edwards would be to limit the ability of the state to require persons to convey 
accurate and reliable information in the context of occupational speech). 
172. Id. 
173. Courts applying rational basis review seek only to determine whether a law is “rationally 
related” to a “legitimate” government interest, whether real or hypothetical. FTC v. Beach Commc’ns, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 n.6 (1993). So, for example, in FTC v. Beach Communications, the Court 
explained that to meet the rational basis test, a legislature did not have to explain the purpose of a 
statute and the statute could be based on the court’s own “rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.” Id. at 315. 
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challenges.174 For example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,175 
the Court upheld an Oklahoma statute that had been challenged under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The statute forbade opticians from fitting lenses 
without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist even where 
the optician was just replacing the same lens.176 The Court reasoned that 
although this requirement might seem excessive, the legislature could 
have concluded some people might benefit from visiting a doctor before 
having their lenses replaced.177 
Beginning in the 1990s, the federal courts have cast more scrutiny on 
occupational licensing requirements, and organizations promoting the 
free market, like the Institute for Justice, have attempted to use Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence to promote a “right to earn a living.”178 In 
Cornwell v. Hamilton,179 a district court held that California’s regulations 
requiring African hair braiders to fulfill the same requirements of barbers 
and cosmetologists were unconstitutional. It found most of the skills 
required for becoming a barber or cosmetologist were not relevant to 
African hair braiding.180 At the same time, the skills needed for African 
hair braiding were not tested by the barber and cosmetologist 
requirements.181 As such, it violated the Equal Protection and Substantive 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to lump these 
                                                     
174. See Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (rejecting a challenge to 
a law restricting advertisement of dentists on the grounds that it was repugnant to the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) 
(upholding West Virginia’s physician licensing law against Fourteenth Amendment challenge). 
175. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
176. Id. at 484–85. 
177. Id. at 487 (noting that “[t]he Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in 
many cases” but that “it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of the new requirement”). In one of the few instances where the U.S. Supreme Court 
did strike down a licensing restriction on rational basis review, it involved a much more politically 
charged subject matter. In Schware v. Board. of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 246–
47 (1957), the Court ruled that it was irrational for an applicant to the New Mexico bar to be denied 
entry because of previous arrests (but no convictions), the previous use of an assumed name, and 
membership in the Communist party twenty years prior.  
178. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute in Support of 
Petitioner, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-716), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/legal-briefs/powers-v-harris [https://perma.cc/X23F-FDJQ] 
(Amicus brief by Cato Institute and Pacific Legal Foundation arguing for the recognition of a right to 
earn living under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); CARPENTER, supra note 11; 
Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207 (2003) (arguing for the 
recognition of a right to earn a living under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
179. 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
180. Id. at 1118–19. 
181. Id. at 1118 (finding “that the State’s mandated curriculum . . . does not teach braiding while at 
the same time it requires hair braiders to learn too many irrelevant, and even potentially harmful, tasks”). 
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disparate occupations together and treat them alike.182 Later lawsuits in 
Utah and Texas involving African hair braiders required to meet barber 
and cosmetology licensing requirements resulted in similar decisions.183 
In Craigmiles v. Giles184 and St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille,185 the Sixth 
and Fifth Circuits respectively found that requirements that caskets could 
only be sold by funeral home directors who had met certain licensing 
requirements did not further public safety or another legitimate state goal 
and so were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.186 Similarly, in Merrifield v. 
Lockyer,187 the Ninth Circuit found that applying pest control licensing 
requirements on some practitioners that did not use pesticides, but not 
others, was merely protectionist, served no government interest such as 
protecting consumers from harm, and therefore violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.188 
Other federal judges, though, have been less open to striking down 
occupational licensing requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For example, in contrast to Cornwell, a Missouri district court decision in 
2016 upheld cosmetology requirements challenged by an African hair 
braider under the Fourteenth Amendment, finding they did have a public 
health and consumer protection rationale.189 And in contrast to Craigmiles 
and St. Joseph Abbey, the Tenth Circuit in Powers v. Harris190 upheld 
licensing requirements for selling funeral caskets. Significantly, Chief 
Judge Tacha, in writing the opinion in Powers, found that “absent a 
violation of a specific constitutional provision or other federal law, 
intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a legitimate state 
                                                     
182. Id. at 1119 (finding that the link between the practice of African hair braiding and the 
cosmetology requirements were irrational).  
183. Brantley v. Kuntz, No. A-13-CA-872-SS, 2015 WL 75244 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (striking down 
Texas requirements for a cosmetology school as it applied to a woman who wanted to teach African 
hair braiding, claiming the extensive requirements for a cosmetology school were irrational for 
African hair braiding and violated a freedom to pursue one’s profession); Clayton v. Steinagal, 885 
F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1215 (D. Utah 2012) (striking down parts of Utah cosmetology act that applied to 
African hair braiders because they “irrationally” squeezed two disparate occupations into the same 
professional mold). 
184. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). 
185. 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013). 
186. Id. at 227; Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228–29. 
187. 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008). 
188. Id. at 990–92 (finding that the state requiring licensing for non-pesticide pest controllers of 
bats, raccoons, skunks, and squirrels, but not of mice, rats, or pigeons had no rational basis and so 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
189. Niang v. Carroll, No. 4:14 CV 1100 JMB, 2016 WL 5076170, at *16–17 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2016). 
190. 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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interest.”191 In upholding a teeth whitening licensing requirement 
challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment in Sensational Smiles, LLC 
v. Mullen,192 Judge Calabresi came to a similar conclusion for the Second 
Circuit, also finding “intrastate economic protectionism” a legitimate state 
interest.193 Meanwhile, the opinions in Craigmiles, Merrifield, and 
St. Joseph Abbey explicitly rejected that intra-state protectionism on its 
own could be a legitimate state interest that could justify licensing 
restrictions.194 
While the federal judiciary has struck down a relatively small number 
of occupational licensing requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
libertarian organizations and others have used this jurisprudence to 
challenge a range of licensing restrictions. Combined with the federal 
courts’ interpretation of antitrust law and the First Amendment, the 
federal judiciary has placed significant limitations on both when 
occupational licensing restrictions can be used and how practitioners may 
regulate them. 
III. THE MULTIPLE JUSTIFICATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING 
As the last Part showed, in recent years the federal judiciary’s 
occupational licensing jurisprudence has embraced a view that is 
frequently skeptical of professional self-regulation and wary of 
restrictions on the market that do not protect the public from harm. While 
occupational licensing is frequently justified as a tool used to protect the 
public from harm, it has also been justified on other grounds. This part 
categorizes and explores four major justifications for licensing: 
(1) protecting the public from harm; (2) creating communities of 
knowledge and competence; (3) fostering relationships of trust; and 
                                                     
191. Id. at 1221.  
192. 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015). 
193. Id. at 286 (“We join the Tenth Circuit and conclude that economic favoritism is rational for 
purposes of our review of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). In his holding, Judge 
Calabresi cited to Justice Alito’s dissent in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 
574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015), where Alito explained that a court that is trying to sniff out 
improper protectionism will have little difficulty finding it, creating a slippery slope that could 
invalidate numerous state regulations. Sensational Smiles, LLC, 793 F.3d at 287.  
194. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[N]either precedent nor 
broader principles suggest that mere economic protection of a particular industry is a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[M]ere 
economic protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is irrational with respect to 
determining if a classification survives rational basis review.”); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 
224 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that “protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is 
not a legitimate governmental purpose”).  
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(4) buffering producers from the market. These four justifications are not 
applicable in every context, nor will they necessarily trump concerns 
about the costs of licensing. The goal of detailing these justifications is 
instead to make clear that occupational licensing can promote different 
values or goals in the economy. Acknowledging these diverse 
justifications, as the next Part will show, should caution the courts against 
imposing an overly narrow economic vision of when and how 
occupational licensing should be used. 
Before beginning, it is worth noting that the justifications for 
occupational licensing are not the same as those for professional self-
regulation. Importantly though, as will be discussed in this Part, self-
regulation can often contribute to supporting some of the possible goals 
of an occupational licensing regime. 
A. Protecting the Public from Harm 
The most commonly and widely invoked justification for occupational 
licensing is protecting consumers and the public from harm by ensuring 
that practitioners have a certain degree of expertise or competence.195 
Occupational licensing may be viewed as especially necessary where 
consumers are vulnerable because of asymmetries in information, 
capacity, or power, or if failure to competently provide a service can have 
particularly dire consequences. For example, a primary justification of 
licensing medical professionals is because of perceived information and 
capacity asymmetries and the potentially significant health consequences 
of improper care.196 Occupational licensing is also often justified to 
protect third parties. Truck drivers, for instance, are licensed more to 
                                                     
195. The protection of consumers and the public has been articulated by the Supreme Court to 
justify occupational licensing. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to protect the public from those 
who seek for one purpose or another to obtain its money. When one does so through the practice of a 
calling, the state may have an interest in shielding the public against the untrustworthy, the 
incompetent, or the irresponsible, or against unauthorized representation of agency. A usual method 
of performing this function is through a licensing system.”); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 
122 (1889) (“The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to 
prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the 
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud.”); see also CLEAR, 
supra note 84, at 1 (finding that generally the purpose of occupational licensing in the U.S. is to protect 
the “public’s health, safety, and/or welfare”). 
196. Services like medical care are frequently needed during a time of distress and vulnerability, 
which limits the ability of consumers to choose amongst potential providers. See SHIMBERG, ESSER 
& KRUGER, supra note 72, at 11. 
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protect the public from poor quality drivers than to protect those who 
employ these drivers.197 
While most policymakers recognize the protection from harm as a 
justification for occupational licensing, there is disagreement about what 
type of harm might justify licensing. A libertarian may view licensing as 
only justified where it can be shown to protect the physical safety or health 
of third parties, but that licensing should not be used to protect consumers 
from willfully entering into an agreement with a service provider.198 For 
example, a libertarian may argue an unlicensed medical practitioner 
should be able to treat a patient as long as the patient consents.199 Others 
take a broader view, claiming, for instance, that licensing is justified to 
protect not only the physical wellbeing of the public or consumers but also 
their more general welfare—for instance, requiring licensing of a 
practitioner if it may help the consumer avoid significant financial loss.200 
B. Communities of Knowledge and Competence 
Since at least the 1960s, much of the academic literature has focused 
on the professions’ perceived rent-seeking behavior,201 but theorists of an 
earlier era celebrated the professions for their ability to help develop 
knowledge around an occupational field and ensure its competent 
implementation.202 Writing in the 1890s, Emile Durkheim argued that 
professional associations were a place of human sociability that naturally 
sprung up around a particular occupation and in turn created ethical rules 
that then regulated the occupation and mediated the use of technical 
                                                     
197. For example, the mission of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), 
which creates national minimum standards for commercial driver’s licenses, is to “reduce crashes, 
injuries and fatalities involving large trucks and buses.” See Our Mission, FED. MOTOR CARRIER 
SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/mission [https://perma.cc/CUE3-ZS88].  
198. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 139–46. 
199. Id. at 149–60 (arguing against even the occupational licensing of doctors).  
200. See CLEAR, supra note 84, at 1 (finding that occupational licensing is often justified to protect 
the public’s welfare). 
201. For a brief overview of the academic literature on the professions, see ANDREW ABBOTT, THE 
SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 134–42 (1988) (describing 
how, among other effects, professions use their monopoly power to raise wages for practitioners); 
Tanina Rostain, Professional Power: Lawyers and the Constitution of Professional Authority, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Sarat ed., 2004). 
202. This focus on the regulation of knowledge has also been taken up by more recent authors. See 
ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL 
KNOWLEDGE 17 (1988) (focusing on the professions as agents for knowledge in the modern economy). 
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knowledge in the economy.203 A few decades later, Talcott Parsons 
claimed that the development of the professions was critical for the 
application of science and technology and that their development was one 
of the hallmarks of a modern society.204 More recently, Robert Post has 
claimed professional knowledge communities can only function 
effectively if there are institutions that are given the authority to determine 
what constitutes expert knowledge and judge competent practice.205 
Occupational licensing requirements have helped spawn schools or 
training programs, as well as professional standards, in disciplines as 
varied as engineering and cosmetology.206 These institutions can help 
overcome market failures—developing and refining the use of 
occupational knowledge in ways that the market might not naturally 
promote. For instance, if entrants into an unrestricted occupational field 
faced constant low-quality competition from unlicensed practitioners, 
they might not devote adequate time or resources to their education or 
training.207 Not only may this underinvestment harm consumers, but it can 
reduce economic efficiency, especially in fields where consumers lack 
reliable information about practitioners or technical knowledge about the 
field. In this way, occupational licensing can provide a signal for 
competence that can lessen consumers’ search costs—knowing that they 
can rely on a basic level of service from someone who is licensed to be a 
“doctor” or an “architect.”208 
                                                     
203. DURKHEIM, supra note 22, at 6–7 (arguing that since society has little interest in the ethics of 
particular professions, it is up to the professions to develop and enforce professional morality for the 
benefit of society). 
204. PARSONS, supra note 22, at 34 (noting that “professions occupy a position of importance in 
our society which is, in any comparable degree of development, unique in history” and claiming that 
“the pursuit and the application of science and liberal learning are predominantly carried out in a 
professional context”). 
205. See POST, supra note 138, at 29–33 (describing systems by which expert knowledge is created 
as being hierarchical and distinct from a freewheeling marketplace of ideas). 
206. NAT’L SOC’Y PROF. ENGINEERS, supra note 57, 
https://www.nspe.org/resources/licensure/what-pe [https://perma.cc/N3VL-RWKS] (noting that to 
become licensed, engineers must attain a four-year college degree). 
207. KLEINER, supra note 1, at 7 (“Licensing creates greater incentives for individuals to invest in 
more occupation-specific human capital because they will be able to recoup the full returns on their 
investment if they do not need to face low-quality substitutes for their services.” (citation omitted)); 
Carl Shapiro, Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing, 53 REV. ECON. STUDIES 843, 
844 (1986) (finding that occupational licensing, by constraining low quality sellers, allows other 
sellers to invest in improving quality).  
208. See KLEINER, supra note 1, at 47. Information economists have written about how information 
asymmetry can decrease efficiency in a market—they have promoted the benefits of market signaling 
more generally, including through government intervention, although not necessarily in support of 
licensing. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 500 (1970) (arguing that in markets with information 
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By contributing to the standardization of training in an occupational 
field, Peter Cappelli has argued that licensing requirements can also create 
more efficient labor markets.209 Today, workers are likely to have a 
variety of employers during their career and, partly as a result, both 
employers and unions now spend fewer resources in developing workers’ 
skills.210 Standardized occupational licensing requirements can ensure 
that practitioners undertake a higher (and potentially more beneficial) 
level of training that multiple kinds of employers will value. The training 
and signaling that occupational licensing provides may then help facilitate 
labor movement in an occupational field.211 
C. Relationships of Trust 
Eliot Freidson famously described professional self-regulation as the 
“third logic.”212 He claimed that professions were traditionally guided by 
neither the consumerist logic of the market nor the management driven 
logic of bureaucracy, but instead expertise coupled with an internal code 
of ethics.213 This understanding that practitioners aspire towards a higher 
occupational mission can encourage trust between practitioners and 
consumers, the public, government, and other professional colleagues. For 
example, the public has historically trusted doctors to give advice in a 
patient’s best interest, not the doctor’s financial interest (even if this trust 
has declined in the United States in recent decades).214 Lawyers rely on 
other lawyers not to lie to them during discovery.215 And the government 
                                                     
asymmetry, there is an incentive for sellers to market poor quality merchandise and so for there to be 
an under-investment in quality, and noting that licensing is one mechanism that has arisen to 
counteract the effects of this uncertainty in quality); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change 
in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 471–72 (2002) (arguing that markets do not 
provide efficient incentive for market disclosure and that there is a role for government in correcting 
this problem).  
209. See PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN 
WORKFORCE 163 (1999). 
210. Id.  
211. Id. 
212. FREIDSON, supra note 24, at 1–16 (presenting professionalism as an alternative to the logic of 
consumerism or bureaucracy). 
213. Id. 
214. Robert J. Blendon et al., Public Trust in Physicians—U.S. Medicine in International 
Perspective, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1570 (2014) (reporting on an International Social Survey 
Programme poll that found 73% of Americans “had great confidence in the leaders of the medical 
profession” in 1966 compared to 34% in 2012). 
215. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation”). 
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relies on architects to help enforce building codes216 or doctors to help 
decide who qualifies for government programs like social security 
disability.217 Importantly, professional communities frequently work to 
pass on this sense of social trusteeship to new practitioners as they meet 
their educational licensing requirements, and later, if this trust is seriously 
betrayed, these practitioners may have their occupational license 
revoked.218 
Since licensing provides a monopoly to practitioners to engage in an 
occupational activity, licensing can limit the ability of large corporations 
and other employers from exercising disproportionate control over either 
practitioners or their occupation. Michael Sandel has claimed that to 
further the ideals of republican self-governance, workers need to be 
empowered to have greater economic autonomy—freed from brute 
market forces that can distract citizens from their democratic duties and 
the concentration of power in large corporations that can undermine the 
public square.219 While Sandel does not invoke professions specifically in 
his argument, occupational licensing, and the professions’ self-regulation, 
provides one avenue for producers to exercise power over their work and 
employment market.220 
Indeed, professional self-regulation, in particular, can reduce the 
potential for capture of regulation by large corporations. For example, in 
the United Kingdom, the Legal Services Board regulates the legal 
profession and is controlled by non-lawyers.221 Commentators have raised 
concerns that these public regulators may be unduly influenced not by the 
                                                     
216. Architects: Occupational Outlook Handbook, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Architecture-and-Engineering/Architects.htm#tab-2 
[https://perma.cc/7SEN-4SDF] (“In developing designs, architects must follow state and local 
building codes, zoning laws, fire regulations, and other ordinances, such as those requiring easy access 
to buildings for people who are disabled.”). 
217. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITY BENEFITS 5–6 (2015), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-
05-10029.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TD7-N5GE] (noting the role of the doctor in providing information to 
Social Security on the condition of an applicant for disability).  
218. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (stating grounds 
upon which a disciplinary board can find a lawyer committed misconduct).  
219. See SANDEL, supra note 26, at 329–38. 
220. Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ 
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 215, 222 (Robert L. Nelson, 
David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992) (arguing that “[t]he professional model is based 
on the democratic notion that people are capable of controlling themselves by cooperative, collective 
means and that in the case of complex work, those who perform it are in the best position to make 
sure that it is done well”). 
221. Robinson, supra note 76, at 59–60 (arguing that in the U.K. a shift to regulators of the legal 
profession that are not lawyers, but come from a competition background, may bias regulation towards 
the interests of corporations that are investing in legal services and liberalizing the legal market). 
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bar, but instead by corporate interests that desire to liberalize the legal 
market to allow corporations to directly profit from providing legal 
services.222 
Occupational licensing, and self-regulation, may also provide 
autonomy to members of an occupation to make unique contributions to 
the public square. For example, lawyers and bar associations have played 
a well-documented role in reforming government and state formation,223 
doctors and psychologists take oaths not to torture (even at the demand of 
the government),224 and civil engineers rank the quality of the nation’s 
roads and bridges to provide an independent assessment to the public of 
dangers posed by infrastructure.225 Alexander Hamilton went so far as to 
claim that those from the professions were particularly well-equipped to 
be political representatives in a democracy because they had relative 
occupational autonomy and so were not beholden to particular 
commercial interests.226 It is an argument continued, in modified form, 
today by commentators like Fareed Zakaria.227 
Significantly, not all occupational groups that require a license promote 
social trusteeship or public-minded goals equally. Those that do are not 
always successful in furthering these goals,228 and, arguably, this social 
trusteeship role has decreased as the professions have become more 
                                                     
222. Id. 
223. DAVID A. BELL, LAWYERS AND CITIZENS: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL ELITE IN OLD 
REGIME FRANCE 7 (1994) (describing the role of independent bar associations and French barristers 
in reforming the old regime in France); Terrence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcom M. Feeley, 
The Legal Complex in Struggles for Political Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1, 3–4 (Terrence C. 
Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2007) (finding that in some contexts lawyers are 
active agents of the construction of political liberalism).  
224. Julie Beck, ‘Do No Harm’: When Doctors Torture, ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/12/do-no-harm-when-doctors-torture/383677/ 
[https://perma.cc/XLJ6-LZJR] (noting that doctors and psychologists take an oath not to torture). 
225. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2013 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD (2013), 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/ [https://perma.cc/H2A3-74HN]. 
226. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander Hamilton), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed35.asp [https://perma.cc/XT7V-XY5Q] (“Will not the 
man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different 
branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, 
so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society?”). 
227. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND 
ABROAD 223–25 (2003) (arguing that an independent legal profession insulated from the pressures of 
the market has played a spirited role in promoting political liberalism in the United States). 
228. Beck, supra note 224 (noting that the Senate Report on CIA Detention and Interrogation 
Program shows doctors and psychologists participated in designing torture). 
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commercialized.229 Despite these caveats, many occupations that require 
a license have had a long history of promoting public-spirited activity and 
social trusteeship among practitioners.230 Occupational licensing can play 
an important part in furthering this goal. 
D. Buffering Producers from the Market 
By limiting entry into an occupation and prescribing standards of 
practice, occupational licensing protects practitioners from at least some 
of the competitive forces of the larger market. Because of this effect, 
economists and others have often criticized licensing for being 
anticompetitive.231 This anticompetitive effect may be justified because a 
licensing requirement protects consumers from harm or has some other 
social benefit, like fostering communities of knowledge or promoting 
social trusteeship. 
Yet, this anticompetitive effect may itself serve the public interest in 
some contexts. For example, occupational licensing may protect 
producers from market instability in a market that the public relies on for 
needed goods or services. In Nebbia v. New York,232 the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a law that fixed the 
price of milk because it “prevent[ed] ruthless competition from destroying 
the wholesale price structure on which the farmer depends for his 
livelihood, and the community for an assured supply of milk.”233 A similar 
argument can be made for using occupational licensing to protect certain 
occupations from price wars that may otherwise repel talented 
practitioners from the labor market or stop capable students from entering 
the occupation. 
Such anticompetitive protectionism may also be used to explicitly 
stabilize the labor market for the benefit not of consumers, but of labor. 
Karl Polyani famously maintained that a key role of the state should be to 
                                                     
229. BRINT, supra note 158 (arguing that professions are becoming marketized and commercialized 
and as a result their rhetorical justifications have shifted from social trusteeship to expertise). 
230. MICHAEL BURRAGE, REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL 
PROFESSION: ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES 594 (Keith Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) 
(noting that “[p]rofessions have persuaded hundreds and thousands of individuals to act in some kind 
of concert over generations, with only occasional reference to their economic self-interests, so it is 
unlikely that their collective institutions can be understood simply as an aggregate of self-interested 
actors”). 
231. See, e.g., KLEINER, supra note 1, at 59–62 (reviewing economic literature showing that, for 
select occupations, restricting entry through occupational licensing regulations results in higher prices 
for consumers). 
232. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
233. Id. at 530. 
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slow the churn of modern capitalism and its dislocating effects on 
members of society.234 Occupational licensing can be seen as one way of 
achieving this end. Although occupational licensing may increase the 
price of some services for the poor and middle class, it also provides those 
in an occupation that requires a license (a significant portion of the 
workforce) with a higher income and other benefits, like less chance of 
being unemployed and a greater probability of receiving a pension plan.235 
Many in the poor and middle class aspire to be in an occupation that 
requires a license, as they once aspired to be in a union job, in the hopes 
of building their lives around the relative stability, prestige, and security 
licensing can bring.236 Like union jobs, these better-paid, more secure 
positions may provide broader positive externalities to society, such as 
creating a stable environment for families to prosper.237 
In this way, occupational licensing may be viewed as an imperfect 
check against some of the harshness of the modern economy, whether this 
is volatile labor markets, wage stagnation or decline, or reduction in 
worker autonomy.238 Unlike alternative strategies to deal with economic 
volatility, such as resource transfers from winners to losers, licensing 
                                                     
234. One can view lobbying by professional associations for occupational licensing as a push for 
protective anti-free market laws. POLYANI, supra note 26 (arguing the state had a central role in 
creating the modern market economy, including markets in labor and land, and that this social 
dislocation then created a “double movement” in which society attempted to protect itself with anti-
market laws). 
235. GITTLEMAN, KLEE & KLEINER, supra note 5 (finding that those with a license earn higher pay, 
are more likely to be employed, and have a higher probability of retirement and pension plan offers); 
Kim A. Wedeen, Why Do Some Occupations Pay More Than Others? Social Closure and Earnings 
Inequality in the United States, 108 AM. J. SOC. 55, 91 (2002) (finding that both occupational licensing 
and credentialing have a strong effect on increasing the earnings in occupations that use this closure 
technique). 
236. Marie R. Haug & Marvin B. Sussman, Professionalization and Unionism: A Jurisdictional 
Dispute?, in THE PROFESSIONS AND THEIR PROSPECTS 89, 89 (Eliot Freidson ed., 1973) 
(“Unionization and professionalization are two processes by which members of an occupation seek 
to achieve collective upward mobility.”); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Work Fatigue, INDIAN EXPRESS (May 
23, 2015, 12:38 AM), https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/work-fatigue/ 
[https://perma.cc/4C4K-JU5V] (noting that in the Indian context “[t]he professions define middle 
class aspiration and are the structures through which the middle class exercises hegemony”). 
237. GITTLEMAN, KLEE & KLEINER, supra note 5 at 21 (finding that compared to similarly placed 
non-union workers, union workers earn 18.2% more on average). Richard Freeman, for example, has 
argued that unions reduce turnover and increase worker savings, creating larger benefits to the 
economy and society. Richard B. Freeman, What Do Unions Do? The 2004 M-Brane Stringtwister 
Edition, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO? A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 607, 619–22 (James T. Bennett 
& Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007).  
238. POLYANI, supra note 26; David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and 
Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 23 (2014) (describing how law will mediate conflict 
between excesses and inequalities engendered by free market capitalism and social forces reacting to 
these elements of capitalism).  
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provides a buffer that can allow those in these occupations to continue to 
build skills and work with dignity.239 
Taken to the extreme, using occupational licensing to protect workers 
from the market could stifle all labor market change and pit the interests 
of fixed groups of workers against each other. Yet as James Whitman has 
argued, U.S. law has become increasingly focused on consumers (i.e., the 
demand side of the economy) at the expense of a focus of law on the 
interests of workers, unions, or small producers (i.e., the supply side).240 
It may be time in the United States to create a new equilibrium between 
the interests of producers and those of consumers. Given its pervasiveness 
in the labor market, occupational licensing could be a central tool used in 
those efforts. 
IV. EFFECT ON OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING JURISPRUDENCE 
Currently, the federal judiciary risks furthering, and frequently 
constitutionalizing, an overly blunt libertarian, market-driven, 
understanding of occupational licensing. This Part takes examples from 
case law in the antitrust, First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment 
contexts to show how recognizing a broader set of justifications for 
occupational licensing should limit the judiciary from pushing such a 
narrow view. 
A. Antitrust Law and Occupational Autonomy 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence in the occupational 
licensing context imposes the Justices’ views of the dangers of regulatory 
capture, while discounting the potential benefits of professional self-
regulation. Granted, unlike in the constitutional context, Congress, if it 
chooses, can overturn the Court’s antitrust judgments through changing 
statutory law. However, in actual practice, major amendments or additions 
                                                     
239. Members of a number of occupations have sought licensing historically not just to protect 
consumers, but also to improve their well-being and gain social status. Lawrence M. Friedman, 
Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890–1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. 
L. REV. 487, 499–501 (1965) (noting that the movement to license barbers initially came out of the 
barbers’ union, and that undertakers organized in part to gain professional prestige in an otherwise 
low status occupation).  
240. Whitman, supra note 26, at 348 (“Despite all the global pressures to embrace economic 
consumerism, when continental Europeans gaze upon the modern marketplace, they remain much 
more likely than Americans to perceive rights and interests on the supply side, rather than on the 
demand side.”). 
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to antitrust law have been relatively rare.241 Courts should not assume that 
Congress would quickly overturn their interpretation of antitrust law 
through legislation even where Congress disagrees.242 Further, state 
governments must abide by these judicial interpretations of federal 
antitrust law even where they disagree with the outcome. 
As discussed in section II.A, while the U.S. Supreme Court long 
declined to aggressively apply antitrust law to occupational licensing 
boards, this changed in 2015 in North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners.243 In the case, the Court found that anticompetitive actions of 
occupational licensing boards controlled by market participants (i.e., 
practitioners) would be subject to antitrust scrutiny unless these actions 
were actively supervised by the state.244 The Court’s decision came 
directly out of the fear that practitioners on licensing boards are likely to 
take actions that benefit themselves rather than the public–in other words, 
from a concern about regulatory capture.245 
Although the Court emphasized the perceived evils of capture, it did 
not explicitly consider the potential benefits of practitioners having 
substantial control over their own regulation. As Daniel Carpenter and 
David Moss have argued, policymakers are often too quick to claim the 
negative effects of regulatory capture and the literature shows much more 
mixed effects of interest groups’ involvement with their own 
regulation.246 In the occupational licensing context, in particular, there are 
few empirical studies on whether having occupational licensing boards 
controlled by market participants actually leads to better or worse 
outcomes for consumers or society.247 
                                                     
241. The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/LJ42-4Q5D] (noting that the three central antitrust acts 
had all been passed by 1914).  
242. Some scholars have even called the Sherman Act a “super-statute” that should be considered to 
have quasi-constitutional status given its importance to the operation of the modern U.S. government. 
WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 119–65 (2010) (arguing that the 
Sherman Act is a super-statute that helps lay the foundation for our modern market economy).  
243. See supra section II.A. 
244. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
245. Id. at 1114 (comparing agencies controlled by private trade associations and by market 
participants). 
246. Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: 
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1, 20–21 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss 
eds., 2014). 
247. The White House’s 2015 report on occupational licensing found that “[t]here is little reliable 
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of [having public members on occupational licensing 
boards].” WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 52.  
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Indeed, the control of licensing boards by practitioners may, in fact, 
have a number of benefits. As the previous Part described, these benefits 
include the development and implementation of professional standards by 
a community of experts and the encouragement of practitioners to develop 
trusteeship over the fields they work in and regulate.248 Additionally, 
relying on practitioners to staff occupational licensing boards can 
frequently provide occupational regulation at a lower financial cost to the 
state and with less chance of capture by corporate interests.249 While not 
all occupations can make equal claims to the potential benefits of self-
regulation, the Court’s sweeping approach in North Carolina State Board 
of Dental Examiners risks undercutting the self-governance and autonomy 
that has been a defining characteristic of many occupations.250 
One way to ensure greater autonomy for licensing boards dominated 
by practitioners is for state government officials supervising them (to be 
in compliance with North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners), to 
grant these boards wide discretion. Under antitrust law, the actions of 
occupational licensing boards controlled by practitioners can be explicitly 
anticompetitive if they are implementing a clearly articulated state policy 
and are actively supervised by the state.251 In actively supervising 
licensing boards, state officials should allow licensing boards to take 
actions that are justified not only because they protect the public from 
harm, but also because they further other values identified in the last Part 
of this article. 
The federal courts also have a critical role in protecting the potential 
benefits of professional self-regulation. They can do this in two primary 
ways in the antitrust context. First, they should be open to a wide variety 
of types of state supervision of licensing boards that meet the broad and 
                                                     
248. See supra sections III.B, III.C.  
249. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8; Robinson, supra note 76.  
250. Even scholars that have focused on prioritizing consumer (over worker or social) interest in 
antitrust law, such as Bork and Posner, have argued antitrust law should be based on what is best for 
consumers, not necessarily fixating on combatting monopolistic behavior, which only in some 
instances might be detrimental to consumers. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A 
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) (arguing only anticompetitive behavior that hurts consumers 
should be found to violate antitrust law); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE (1976) (making a similar argument that antitrust law should only focus on economic 
efficiency).  
251. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111–14 (1980); 
FTC, FTC STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE STATE SUPERVISION OF STATE REGULATORY BOARDS 
CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS 1 (2015) [hereinafter FTC STAFF GUIDANCE] (“In general, 
a state may avoid all conflict with the federal antitrust laws by creating regulatory boards that serve 
only in an advisory capacity, or by staffing a regulatory board exclusively with persons who have no 
financial interest in the occupation that is being regulated.”). 
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relatively ambiguous standard set out by the Court in North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners.252 Under this context specific standard, the 
state supervisor must at least actively review the substance of an 
anticompetitive decision of a licensing board and have the power to veto 
it.253 However, courts should not, for example, require licensing boards 
demand detailed information justifying the decision (which in any case 
may not be available or expensive to obtain).254 Having an overly 
aggressive interpretation of active supervision would dramatically reduce 
regulatory autonomy in many occupations. 
Second, the federal courts should be restrained in striking down actions 
of unsupervised licensing boards as anticompetitive. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court suggested in National Society of Professional Engineers, “by their 
nature, professional services may differ significantly from other business 
services, and, accordingly, the nature of competition in such services may 
vary.”255 
Under the Court’s jurisprudence, explicit price fixing or restrictions on 
competitive bidding by an unsupervised practitioner-dominated licensing 
board would likely be deemed anticompetitive.256 Similarly, if licensing 
boards attempt to unilaterally expand the boundaries of the professional 
community they regulate, such as claiming that teeth whitening 
constitutes the practice of dentistry in North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners, the courts are likely to find this to be anticompetitive 
conduct.257 
On the other hand, after North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners, both the federal courts and the FTC have indicated that an 
unsupervised licensing board will generally not attract antitrust scrutiny 
for disciplining a practitioner for not meeting mandated standards of 
                                                     
252. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116 (2015). For 
a discussion of this case, see supra notes 109–123 and accompanying text. 
253. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116. 
254. Following the decision, the FTC issued staff guidance for its implementation. FTC STAFF 
GUIDANCE, supra note 251. The FTC found that relevant factors to determine whether there is 
supervision by the state include whether the state supervisor has obtained the information necessary 
to evaluate the action of the regulatory board (such as holding a public hearing and gathering data) or 
issued a written decision approving or disapproving of the regulatory action and explained the 
rationale of such a decision. Id. at 9–10. 
255. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). 
256. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (finding that even price 
fixing that sets a maximum sealing for price is a per se violation of competition law).  
257. See, e.g., Henry v. N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15CV831, 2017 WL401234 
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2017) (mem.) (allowing for antitrust suit to proceed against acupuncture licensing 
board for warning physical therapists to not perform dry needling). 
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practice.258 Since a licensing board brings the action against an individual 
it is difficult to argue there is an adverse impact on competition in the 
market overall or that members of a licensing board are conspiring to 
restrain trade by simply sanctioning a single practitioner.259 
Still, it is an open question if and when other actions by occupational 
licensing boards violate antitrust law. Since Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey v. United States,260 section 1 of the Sherman Act has been 
understood to allow “reasonable restrictions” on competition.261 These 
reasonable restrictions have been interpreted as those whose 
procompetitive effects outweigh their anticompetitive effects.262 So, for 
example, a licensing board may prohibit practitioners from engaging in 
deceptive business practices because doing otherwise could undermine 
the market, hurting competition.263 
However, as Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw have noted, not all socially 
beneficial restrictions will necessarily be seen as procompetitive.264 
Because one of the primary justifications of occupational licensing is to 
restrict competition to improve quality, Edlin and Haw advocate that 
                                                     
258. Petrie v. Va. Bd. of Med., 648 Fed. App’x. 352 (4th Cir. 2016) (dismissing antitrust challenge 
by chiropractor who had been punished by Board of Medicine for offering services that required 
medical license because restraint on one practitioner not enough to account for restraint on trade and 
could not show agreement among board members to restrain trade); Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary 
Med., 157 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D. Conn. 2016) (dismissing an antitrust challenge by a veterinarian who 
had disciplined by the state board for using a vaccination procedure not prescribed by the board); FTC 
STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 251, at 6. 
259. Petrie, 648 Fed. Appx. 352; Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(finding that hospital staff had not violated antitrust law when they revoked a doctor’s staff privileges 
because the revocation of his privileges did not adversely affect competition in the market and there 
was no agreement among staff to create a monopoly).  
260. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
261. Id. at 66. 
262. In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, Justice Brandeis famously laid out 
the reasonableness test as:  
[W]hether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates, and perhaps thereby promotes, 
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine 
that question, the court must ordinarily consider . . . [t]he history of the restraint, the evil believed 
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be 
attained . . . . 
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
263. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 251, at 6.  
264. Edlin & Haw, supra note 94, at 1145. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 685 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a restriction by a professional 
association meant to limit price comparison that the association claimed limited bidding wars on 
engineering projects and so, they argued, improved quality and public safety. The Court explained that 
the restriction ran against the heart of the Sherman Act and that, as to whether the restriction actually 
improved public safety, that “the [antitrust] statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether 
competition is good or bad.” Id. at 679 (cited in Edlin & Haw, supra note 94, at 1145). 
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licensing requirements that improve quality be considered 
procompetitive, and therefore reasonable restrictions, under rule of reason 
antitrust analysis.265 They make a similar argument for licensing 
restrictions that improve consumer access to information.266 Doing 
otherwise would severely impair the ability of occupational licensing 
boards to perform their key regulatory functions. 
Drawing on a similar logic, the federal courts should also find 
requirements that promote other justifications for licensing outlined in this 
article “reasonable restrictions” under anti-trust law. Take, for example, 
the goal of fostering a sense of trusteeship by practitioners over their 
occupation. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,267 
stated that the “public service aspect, and other features of the professions, 
may require that a particular practice, which could be properly be viewed 
a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated 
differently.”268 So, for instance, under this reasoning limitations on 
advertising by a licensing board should not necessarily be seen as 
anticompetitive, not only because such limitations may protect consumers 
from harm, but also because such restrictions can help foster an 
environment in which practitioners view their clients or patients as more 
than just mere customers.269 Similarly, requirements that lawyers 
undertake pro bono should not be considered anticompetitive even though 
they mandate practitioners offer some services at a set price (i.e., for 
free).270 These requirements not only help some clients access services 
they could not otherwise afford, but they also help practitioners develop a 
sense of social trusteeship over their occupation, helping counteract the 
commodification of interactions between practitioners and those they 
serve. 
                                                     
265. Edlin & Haw, supra note 94, at 1148 (“[C]ourts should accept arguments that a restriction 
improves consumer access to information or raises quality of service as procompetitive justifications.”). 
266. Id.  
267. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
268. Id. at 788 n.17. 
269. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (finding that the FTC has jurisdiction over a 
voluntary non-profit association, but that an assessment of whether the association’s restrictions on 
price and quality advertising violated antitrust law requires a rule of reason analysis, and not just a 
quick look analysis, as such restrictions do not obviously have an anticompetitive effect).  
270. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (finding that even price fixing that 
only sets a maximum sealing for price is a per se violation of competition law); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983) (suggesting that lawyers should aspire to at least 50 
hours of pro bono service per year).  
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B. Occupational Speech and the Market 
The multiple justifications of occupational licensing should also shape 
the judiciary’s First Amendment jurisprudence. The question of how the 
First Amendment should apply to occupational licensing requirements 
takes place within the larger expansion of free speech to protect 
commercial speech that began in the 1970s.271 This evolving 
jurisprudence threatens many regulations of the modern regulatory state 
from labeling requirements to regulations regarding credit cards or 
prescription drugs,272 prompting some to call the federal judiciary’s 
commercial speech interventions a return to Lochnerism—using free 
speech to promote libertarian ideals about protecting a free market.273 
Meanwhile, Justice Thomas’s explicit doubts about the existence or reach 
of the professional speech doctrine in NIFLA, along with the Court’s 
broader “weaponized” anti-regulatory use of free speech in cases like 
Janus v. AFSCME,274 raises the prospect of the First Amendment being 
used even further to limit occupational licensing requirements in the 
future. 
                                                     
271. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (laying out 
a four part test for determining whether a state action violates commercial speech); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Weiland, supra note 150, at 1395, 
1426–38 (describing how the Supreme Court developed a new approach to commercial speech 
starting in the 1970s). 
272. Shanor, supra note 159, at 138 (describing a range of regulations threatened by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s expanding commercial speech jurisprudence). 
273. Id. at 137 (“[A]dvocates of the new Lochner are forwarding a formal concept of liberty that 
has no apparent limiting principle. They contend that all speech is speech and equally subject to 
stringent constitutional scrutiny. Given the pervasiveness of speech and expression, taken to its logical 
conclusion, this contention would render democratic self-government impossible.”). Robert Post has 
noted that in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court claimed that restricting 
advertising undercut the efficient functioning of markets. POST, supra note 138, at 39–40. He argues 
this justification for striking down restrictions on advertising made market efficiency an independent 
constitutional value, resurrecting Lochner. POST, supra note 138; see also Sorrel v. IMS Health Inc., 
564 U.S. 552, 602 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“At best the Court opens a Pandora’s Box of First 
Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only incidentally affect a 
commercial message. At worst, it reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial 
for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.” (citation omitted)).  
274. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). In Janus, the Court, in a 5–4 decision, ruled that requiring 
non-union members pay fees to public unions violated the First Amendment. Id. In dissent, Justice 
Kagan argued that the opinion undercut the ability of local officials to make important decisions about 
workplace governance by “weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now 
and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.” Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
For more on how this and other First Amendment judgments have been used to develop a “new 
Lochnerism,” see Jedidiah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class 
Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161 (2018). 
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Robert Post and Amanda Shanor have warned that applying First 
Amendment scrutiny to professional speech would limit the ability of the 
state to require practitioners to convey accurate and reliable 
information.275 Courts would be constantly asked to weigh the free speech 
merits of a wide variety of licensing requirements (such as in medicine or 
law).276 
To protect against this danger, the professional speech doctrine, as 
articulated in Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe, holds that 
occupational licensing restrictions are immune from First Amendment 
scrutiny where a practitioner is offering tailored advice to a client.277 
Acknowledging the multiple justifications of occupational licensing helps 
provide support for the merit of the professional speech doctrine. As the 
last Part showed, licensing can promote a bundle of values—protecting 
consumers from harm, creating communities of knowledge, fostering 
relationships of trust, and buffering producers from the market. The 
professional speech doctrine creates a bright line rule that protects most 
occupational licensing regulations (that do not involve commercial or 
political speech) from First Amendment scrutiny so that courts are not 
then tasked with having to weigh each of these individual justifications in 
a given context. In other words, one reason to create a categorical 
exemption for professional speech from First Amendment scrutiny is to 
avoid the messiness of having courts weigh each of these values in a given 
context. 
Granted, in some instances where there is licensed occupational speech 
it is less than clear if such speech is “professional,” but acknowledging 
the broader values that licensing can promote should still help guide, and 
limit, the judiciary’s approach. 
For instance, in both Edwards and Kagan, a central issue was whether 
the speech of tour guides should be considered professional speech. Judge 
Brown in Edwards argued that a license to be a tour guide should not be 
considered an occupational license of the type Justice White had in mind 
in Lowe.278 He claims that tour guides are not engaged in the practice of a 
profession since they do not “exercise judgment on behalf of the client in 
                                                     
275. Post & Shanor, supra note 171, at 178, 181 (arguing against Paul Sherman that the First 
Amendment should apply indiscriminately to occupational speech, and that such an argument and 
“the libertarian reasoning advanced in a decision like Edwards” would lead to a dystopia where every 
practitioner would be entitled to their personal opinion while performing professional speech). 
276. Id. at 179 (noting that “[t]aken to its logical conclusion, extending First Amendment scrutiny 
to every marketplace speech act would create a First Amendment question every time a lawyer is sued 
for malpractice for an incompetent opinion”). 
277. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985). 
278. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1000 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances”279 and instead 
“provide virtually identical information to each customer.”280 This 
characterization of tour guides by Judge Brown is itself suspect. After all, 
tour guides often do provide tailored information to customers (for 
example, answering individual’s questions or customizing tours to 
specific groups). 
Yet even if we accepted that tour guides—or those in other occupations 
that require a license—did not engage in professional speech, and their 
licensing was then subject to free speech scrutiny, these regulations would 
be more likely to survive if the courts considered the full set of 
justifications for occupational licensing laid out in this Article. The judges 
in both Edwards and Kagan did acknowledge the protection of consumers 
as a potential rationale for licensing tour guides.281 However, neither court 
addressed the three other possible justifications of licensing discussed in 
this Article. Each of these are plausible, if sometimes strained, 
justifications for licensing tour guides. For example, in licensing tour 
guides a locality may wish to encourage the development of a more robust 
knowledge community around giving tours. Alternatively, it may desire 
to promote a relationship not just of economic exchange between a tour 
guide and visitor, but also of trust.282 
In the end, federal courts should recognize that when petitioners claim 
that the First Amendment prohibits an occupational licensing regulation 
they are frequently really arguing that the market should regulate the 
                                                     
279. Id. 
280. Id. (“The District’s brief suggests the tour-guide license, like licensing schemes for lawyers 
and psychiatrists, is merely an occupational license subject only to rational basis review. . . . The 
District is wrong. ‘One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise 
judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances is 
properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession.’ Appellants do no such thing. They 
provide virtually identical information to each customer. . . .” (citations omitted)). 
281. Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 650, 651 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that the purpose of 
the tour guide licensing regime in New Orleans is to protect tourists); Edwards, 755 F.3d at 1009 
(noting that a major declared purpose of licensing tour guides is to ensure that they do not engage in 
unfair or unsafe business practices).  
282. Interestingly, available evidence does indicate a positive correlation between the performance 
of or trust in a tour guide and tourists’ view of a destination location and their shopping behavior. See, 
e.g., Kuo-Chien Chang, Examining the Effect of Tour Guide Performance, Tourist Trust, Tourist 
Satisfaction, and Flow Experience on Tourists’ Shopping Behavior, 19 ASIA PAC. J. TOURISM RES. 
219 (2014) (finding a relationship between tourist trust of a tour guide and their willingness to engage 
in local shopping); Alexandra Matos Pereira, Tour Guides and Destination Images: Evidence from 
Portugal, 3 J. TOURISM & HOSPITALITY MGMT. 129 (2015) (finding a positive relationship between 
tour guide performance and the image of a country as a destination location).  
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occupation.283 Judges should be critical of such Lochner-like claims that 
choose one ideological vision of what counts as valid justifications for 
regulating our economy through tools like occupational licensing.284 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment and “Protectionism” 
Finally, if courts acknowledged the varied justifications of 
occupational licensing in their Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence they 
would be less likely to strike down licensing requirements. To survive 
scrutiny from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses, government action must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, 
or capricious.285 In other words, it simply has to fulfill some public value. 
As described in section II.C, there is currently a split between federal 
circuits over whether “intra-state economic protectionism” is a legitimate 
purpose for occupational licensing requirements under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.286 Understanding occupational licensing as a tool that can be 
used, among other justifications, to buffer practitioners from the market 
makes clearer the merits of viewing “intra-state economic protectionism” 
as a legitimate goal of the state in the licensing context. 
In dismissing “protectionism” as a justification of occupational 
licensing and striking down licensing requirements under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the judges in Craigmiles, St. Joseph Abbey, and Merrifield 
all argued that their actions should not be considered a resurrection of 
Lochnerism and instead be viewed as invalidating naked protectionism 
and “irrational” licensing requirements.287 Yet as Justice Calabresi notes 
                                                     
283. See, e.g., Weiland, supra note 150 (warning that the Supreme Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence has embraced a libertarian view of speech unmoored from either liberal or republican 
rationales for speech); POST, supra note 138, at 39–40 (similarly claiming the Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence has taken a turn towards embracing libertarian market ideals).  
284. See Weiland, supra note 134; POST, supra note 138. 
285. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (finding that due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment “demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, 
and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained”); 
Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689–90 (1984). 
286. See supra section II.C. 
287. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he ghost of Lochner [is 
not] lurking about. We deploy no economic theory of social statics or draw upon a judicial vision of 
free enterprise. Nor do we doom state regulation of casket sales. We insist only that Louisiana’s 
regulation not be irrational . . . .”); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Although economic rights are at stake, we are not basing our decision today on our personal 
approach to economics, but on the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement that similarly situated 
persons must be treated equally.”); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Our 
decision today is not a return to Lochner, by which this court would elevate its economic theory over 
that of legislative bodies. . . . We are not imposing our view of a well-functioning market on the 
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in Sensational Smiles, LLC: “[A] court intent on sniffing out ‘improper’ 
economic protectionism will have little difficulty in finding it.”288 A bright 
line rule recognizing “intra-state economic protectionism” as a legitimate 
state interest provides protection against judges over-eager to strike down 
licensing regulations based on their preferred economic ideology. 
Interestingly, libertarian leaning judges have not always found 
occupational licensing so suspect. During the Lochner era, with its focus 
on the liberty of contract, occupational licensing laws attracted only scant 
and mixed attention from the courts,289 despite these laws being on the rise 
during this period. The U.S. Supreme Court did not strike down any 
occupational licensing requirements during this era as unconstitutional.290 
Occasionally, state supreme courts did strike down these requirements but 
generally only for lower class professions, like horseshoers.291 This 
limited attention is perhaps not surprising. Scholars of the period, like 
Durkheim, saw the professions as an organic and welcome creation of the 
division of labor in a modern society, operating with as much natural self-
organizing logic as the invisible hand of the market.292 Judges also often 
came from a middle-class background and may have viewed the rise of 
occupational licensing as aiding workers like themselves, who were 
striving for professional status.293 
Significantly, one does not have to agree that occupational licensing 
should be used to protect workers, or develop knowledge communities, or 
even protect consumers, to see the danger in constitutionalizing what 
counts as “reasonable” occupational licensing requirements. As Justice 
Holmes famously declared in dissenting in Lochner “the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”294 If 
state or federal governments want to adopt policies that restrict free 
markets—whether it is to promote social welfare, a developmental state, 
or a vision of the economy that emphasizes professional communities 
created through occupational licensing—they should be able to do so. 
                                                     
people of Tennessee. Instead, we invalidate only the General Assembly’s naked attempt to raise a 
fortress protecting the monopoly rents that funeral directors extract from consumers.”). 
288. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 2015). 
289. Friedman, supra note 239, at 489 (noting that occupational licensing cases during the period 
“called down no pronouncements of doom and enlisted neither proponents nor opponents in high and 
academic places to argue validity and propriety on the basis of first principles”). 
290. The U.S. Supreme Court did not strike down occupational licensing laws during the Lochner 
era even if judges did question their wisdom. Id. at 511.   
291. Id. at 517–18. 
292. For example, Emile Durkheim applauded the ability of the professions to create their own 
internal codes of ethics. DURKHEIM, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
293. Friedman, supra note 239, at 521. 
294. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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V. INTERVENTION BY CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 
Just as the federal courts have expanded their interventions, Congress 
and the federal executive have also become significant actors in shaping 
occupational licensing in the country. This Part provides details some of 
the types of ways Congress and the executive are already involved in 
occupational licensing. It then discusses some of the goals these branches 
of government can further through these interventions. Compared to the 
courts, these branches of government have a wider range of interventions 
available to them, can more easily tailor their interventions to specific 
occupations, and they can take action while in explicit dialogue with state 
governments, licensing boards, professional associations, and other 
stakeholders. 
A. Types of Intervention 
Congress and the executive use a variety of tactics to shape 
occupational licensing in the country. In some fields, like transportation 
and finance, the federal government may license practitioners directly. 
For example, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) licenses commercial 
airline pilots as well as flight attendants and airline mechanics,295 the U.S. 
Coast Guard licenses those in the maritime industry,296 and the SEC, in 
conjunction with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), 
licenses investment brokers and some categories of investment 
advisers.297 
In other occupations, the states remain the actual implementing 
authority, but the federal government plays a significant role in creating 
licensing rules. For instance, starting in the 1980s the federal government 
                                                     
295. Become a Pilot, FED. AVIATION AUTHORITY, http://www.faa.gov/pilots/become/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4C6-YAGF] (describing FAA regulations of pilots). The FAA also certifies 
aircraft mechanics. Basic Requirements to Become and Airline Mechanic, FED. AVIATION 
AUTHORITY, https://www.faa.gov/mechanics/become/basic/ [https://perma.cc/VQ4T-VVS3]. 
296. See generally National Maritime Center, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., https://www.dco.uscg.mil/national_maritime_center/ [https://perma.cc/76VV-CVNW] 
(providing application process for various maritime licenses).  
297. For an overview of the complex regulatory environment of investment advisors and brokers, 
see JAMES J. ANGEL, ON THE REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES: WHERE DO WE 
GO FROM HERE? 8–12 (Ctr. for Fin. Mkts. and Policy, 2011); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISORS 2–11 (2013) (describing which investment advisors must 
register with the SEC and specific states). FINRA is a non-profit authorized by Congress to protect 
investors. See About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/DF3C-2F9J]. FINRA administers exams for advisors and brokers, including at the 
state level. For a description of required exams, see Qualification Exams, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/industry/qualification-exams [https://perma.cc/4J26-NQC4]. 
13 - Robinson (3).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2019  12:40 PM 
1956 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1903 
 
mandated that states maintain a set of minimum requirements for 
commercial truck and bus drivers.298 Similarly, after reforms instituted in 
the wake of the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s and the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis of 2008, the federal government now plays a dominant 
role in mandating licensing standards for real estate appraisers, even if the 
actual licensing is still done by the states.299 Along the same lines, while 
accountants are licensed by the states, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
which was passed after a series of accounting scandals in the 1990s, gives 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), whose 
members are appointed by the SEC, a central role in setting standards for 
accountants.300 
Scholars like Abbe Gluck have noted that it has become common for 
the federal government to use state governments to implement its 
                                                     
298. Before the 1980s, the Federal Highway Administration set standards and tests used by the 
driver’s employer to certify them. This previous federal system was criticized as weak because it 
relied on carriers to self-enforce. SHIMBERG, ESSER & KRUGER, supra note 73, at 187–89. The 
Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 31308, established certain minimum 
standards for commercial drivers. Then under the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) was established within the U.S. Department 
of Transportation (DOT), to “reduce crashes, injuries and fatalities involving large trucks and buses.” 
Our Mission, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 197.  
299. After the Savings and Loan Crisis, the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) required states to establish licensing and certification 
requirements for real estate appraisers. Pub. L. No. 101-73, Stat. 183; EDWARD V. MURPHY, 
REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS 1–4 (Congressional Research Service, 2012), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22953.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT53-98WM]. A federal agency, the 
Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC), regularly reviews the compliance of state appraiser boards and 
maintains a registry of licensed or certified appraisers. Id. FIRREA also created a nongovernmental 
organization, the Appraisal Foundation, that is funded by the ASC, which established and maintains 
the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. Id. at 4–5. After the Subprime Mortgage 
crisis, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 included a provision designed to increase 
the independence of appraisers by limiting the ability of others with an interest in a real estate 
transaction from improperly influencing and appraisal with a federally related mortgage. Id. at 5; Pub. 
L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
mandated new standards to ensure the independence of appraisers and established requirements for 
appraiser professional education. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1471–1473, 124 Stat. 
1376, 2185–98 (2010).  
300. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. Accountants were traditionally a self-regulated profession that 
were licensed at the state level and over which the SEC provided some oversight. See L. Glenn Perry, 
Regulation of the Accounting Profession and the Problem of Enforcement, 7 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. 
MARKET L. 291 (1985). PCAOB sets standards for the profession and can discipline both accountant 
firms and practitioners, even at state licensing boards still regulate entry into the accounting 
profession and can terminate licenses. About the PCAOB, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., 
http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/PN9W-E6CL]; JAY D. HANSON, 
REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF THE AUDIT PROFESSION (2012), 
http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/01132012_HansonAAA.aspx [https://perma.cc/P8F9-29NC] 
(discussing rigorous enforcement of accounting standards by PCAOB and criticism that it is too 
stringent). 
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policies.301 Importantly, though, as the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in 
Printz v. United States,302 the federal government cannot, without 
constitutional authority, compel the states to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.303 
The federal government though may incentivize states to participate in 
other ways. In the case of occupational licensing, this has taken different 
forms. For example, the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 
granted power to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to 
write licensing requirements for drivers of vehicles.304 To implement these 
standards it also gave the Secretary power to withhold federal 
transportation funding to states that did not adopt these requirements.305 
In a similar vein, but using a different tactic, the federal government 
mandated that all federally related real estate transactions—essentially 
any such transaction using a federally chartered or insured financial 
institution—had to hire real estate appraisers who complied with federal 
standards.306 
The federal government has also used its treaty-making power to allow 
those licensed in other countries to work in the United States. For 
example, under an agreement the U.S. government first signed with 
Canada and then expanded to Mexico under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, states must recognize the licenses of commercial truck 
drivers from these two countries.307 
                                                     
301. Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014) (arguing that many 
of the most significant state sovereign acts now occur in furtherance of implementing national law). 
302. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
303. See id. at 933 (finding that the federal government may not compel the states to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program).  
304. Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 31308 (2012) (authorizing Secretary 
of Transportation to write uniform standards for commercial drivers in consultation with states).  
305. Id. § 31311(a)(1) (stating that to avoid having Department of Transportation funding withheld, 
the state shall implement minimum licensing standards created by the Secretary of Transportation). 
This tactic of incentivizing states to participate in a federal regulatory program has been upheld by 
the Court. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal 
statute that withheld federal highway funds from states whose legal drinking age did not conform 
with federal policy). 
306. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 323.3, 323.4 (2018) (setting minimum requirements for real estate appraisers 
and mandating that for federally related transactions all appraisers meet these requirements); 
MURPHY, supra note 299, at 2.  
307. For a summary of the history and related regulations of this arrangement, see JOHN FRITTELLI, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUS OF MEXICAN TRUCKS IN THE UNITED STATES: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41821.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6P4-CV7B]; 
Luis de la Calle, Better Late Than Never: Lessons Learned from Mexican Truck Drivers in the United 
States, WILSON CTR. (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/better-late-never-lessons-
learned-mexican-truck-drivers-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/VPZ2-9Z2S]. 
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Finally, the federal government may not mandate any standards, but 
rather push state and local governments, as well as occupational licensing 
boards, to adopt “best practices.” For example, the Departments of 
Defense and Treasury released a joint report in February 2012 on how 
different states licensing requirements created barriers for military 
spouses to find jobs as they move between states (particularly since many 
military spouses are nurses or teachers).308 When the report was released, 
only eleven states had legislation that eased the ability of military spouses 
to use their licenses in new states, but by June of 2012 twenty-three had 
such legislation309 and by 2016 all fifty states had taken some action.310 
This shift by states seemed in part a response to the joint report as well as 
efforts by First Lady Michelle Obama to push states to adopt such 
legislation.311 
B. Goals of Intervention 
Congress and the executive may attempt to achieve different types of 
goals through their interventions. For example, the federal government 
has frequently acted to limit what it sees as unnecessary state licensing 
requirements. The Obama Administration issued a report aimed at 
creating a framework to curb excessive licensing in the states312 and 
provided money to organizations to work with states to reduce overly 
burdensome licensing requirements.313 Under the Trump Administration, 
                                                     
308. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUPPORTING OUR MILITARY FAMILIES: 
BEST PRACTICES FOR STREAMLINING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING ACROSS STATE LINES (2012). 
309. Brad Cooper, 23 States Have Now Passed Pro-Military Spouse License Portability Measures, 
WHITE HOUSE (June 26, 2012, 4:32 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/26/23-states-
have-now-passed-pro-military-spouse-license-portability-measures [https://perma.cc/6S3Q-ZGLJ]. 
310. Darlene Superville, All 50 States Easing Licensing for Military Spouses, MILITARY.COM (July 
2, 2016), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/07/02/all-50-states-easing-licensing-military-
spouses.html [https://perma.cc/9J2S-K63B]. 
311. Cooper, supra note 309 (noting that First Lady Michelle Obama had spoken to the nation’s 
governors in February 2012 about how they could ease licensing hurdles for military spouses). 
Similarly, after the White House released a report in 2015 calling on states to more narrowly tailor 
occupational licensing restrictions, several states adopted new laws in line with these 
recommendations, such as laws in Georgia and Illinois that prevent occupational licensing boards 
from using criminal convictions to deny a license unless the conviction was relevant to the license 
sought. For an overview of the measures states adopted, or proposed, see FACT SHEET: New Steps 
to Reduce Unnecessary Occupation Licenses that are Limiting Worker Mobility and Reducing Wages, 
WHITE HOUSE (June 17, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/fact-sheet-
new-steps-reduce-unnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting [https://perma.cc/3CPC-E9TD] 
[hereinafter WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET].   
312. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
313. For example, in 2016 the Department of Labor made $7.5 million available for “organizations 
to work with groups of states to design and implement approaches that enhance the portability of 
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the FTC created an Economic Liberty Taskforce that has as a primary 
mission working with states to decide where occupational licensing is 
unnecessary to protect consumers.314 In 2017, Senators Lee, Cruz, and 
Sasse introduced legislation that would give licensing boards antitrust 
immunity in states that agreed to accept a number of conditions, including 
that states adopt a policy that licensing restrictions will only be adopted if 
less restrictive alternatives are not available and that restrictions are only 
used to protect consumers from real, substantial threats to public health, 
safety, and welfare.315 
Congress and the Executive have also acted to harmonize licensing 
across states. This has included intervening to set national standards in 
some fields, such as for truck drivers.316 It may also promote 
standardization between states. For example, the Trump administration is 
currently supporting efforts to create more multistate compacts between 
states to allow for licensing portability.317 In other fields, harmonization 
can be achieved by nationalizing aspects of the licensing process.318 For 
example, given complaints about how state-by-state licensing 
requirements create barriers for the movement of health care 
professionals,319 the federal government could consider nationalizing the 
licensing of nurses, doctors, or other health professionals. 
Significantly, Congress and the Executive can act to improve the use 
of licensing in furthering multiple types of goals. This could be shaping 
smarter licensing restrictions to protect the public from harm. It may also 
include fostering or refining licensing requirements that promote some of 
                                                     
licenses across states and reduce overly burdensome licensing restrictions in general.” WHITE HOUSE 
FACT SHEET, supra note 311. 
314. Jared Meyer, FTC Sets Its Sights on Occupational Licensing, FORBES (April 17, 2017, 10:33 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2017/04/17/ftc-sets-its-sights-on-occupational-
licensing/#47d10ba977ae [https://perma.cc/GT24-JNVZ]. 
315. Restoring Board Immunity Act of 2017, S. 1649, 115th Cong. (2017). 
316. See supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
317. Alexandra Acosta & Dennis Daugaard, Make It Easier to Work Without a License, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/make-it-easier-to-work-without-a-
license-1515457813 [https://perma.cc/ZXW8-R7LJ]. 
318. Most, if not all, occupational licensing impacts interstate commerce so the U.S. government 
could arguably intervene in its regulation. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (finding 
that Congress has the authority to regulate intrastate activities if the activities have a significant effect 
on interstate commerce in the aggregate). It also may intervene where occupational licensing impacts 
other federal interests, like immigration policy. Jennesa Calvo-Friedman, The Uncertain Terrain of 
State Occupational Licensing Laws for Noncitizens: A Preemption Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1597, 
1633–34 (2014) (arguing in the immigration context that federal law preempts states from excluding 
lawfully present noncitizens, but that states maintain the authority to determine occupational 
competencies).  
319. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 308 (noting that licensing 
restrictions on nurses moving between states was particularly difficult for military spouses).  
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the other justifications for licensing explored in this article. For example, 
to further trust between practitioners and the public, the federal 
government may recommend that certain occupations mandate 
practitioners engage in a certain amount of pro bono each year. To 
increase the capacity of knowledge communities in certain occupations 
the federal government could work to require more robust continuing 
education requirements or increase federal funding for research at schools 
that train practitioners. 
The examples of the types of licensing interventions the federal 
government can pursue or the goals it may attempt to achieve through 
these interventions detailed in this Part are not meant to be exhaustive. 
Rather, this brief cataloguing is meant to show that Congress and the 
executive have a wide range of tools to shape occupational licensing, 
many of which they already use. 
These branches of government may choose to adopt an approach 
towards licensing that is economically libertarian or skeptical of 
professional self-regulation. That is their political choice. However, if 
they so decide, Congress and the federal executive can also promote 
alternative visions of licensing that support professional trusteeship, the 
use of licensing as a tool to develop occupational knowledge, or some 
other goal. The federal courts should not stand in their way. Nor should 
they impose a particular vision of occupational licensing on the states. If 
the federal government is to be involved in shaping occupational licensing 
policy in the country it is Congress and the Executive, not the courts, 
which are better positioned to take the lead. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that under its current jurisprudence the federal 
courts risk locking in a narrow view of when and how occupational 
licensing should be used in ways that cannot be easily changed. 
Occupational licensing should be understood as a regulatory tool that not 
only has a number of potential costs but also, as this Article has detailed, 
multiple justifications. Each of these justifications embodies distinct 
values that the state or federal government may legitimately wish to 
promote in the economy. The courts should acknowledge these multiple 
justifications for occupational licensing and limit their interventions 
accordingly. 
 
